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In this thesis I describe three independent projects that advance the develop-
ment of broadband quantum cryptography. While each project pertains to a differ-
ent part of the QKD chain, together they provide key developments in implementing
QKD at bit rates that are practical for use in the modern telecommunications in-
frastructure.
The first project comprises the bulk of the thesis and involves developing a
novel source of correlated photon pairs for use in free-space QKD. This source is
based on a birefringent semiconductor optical waveguide as a Kerr medium. We
demonstrate the feasibility of using birefringent phase-matched four-wave mixing to
generate correlated photon pairs. We further propose that, by reversing the process
and pumping with conjugate wavelengths, one can use the same effect to produce
entangled photon pairs with the same device. These pairs can then be used for QKD
to realize the most secure and efficient quantum cryptographic data links.
The second project examines the implications of operating a BB84 QKD proto-
col at clock rates that are faster than the recovery time of the constituent detectors.
We show that operating such systems under conventional protocols results in a se-
curity violation that allows an eavesdropper to learn significant information about
the key and present a modification to the BB84 protocol that maintains key security
at fast transmission rates. This modification to the protocol will become vital to
QKD viability as links become faster and clock rates go into the tens of gigahertz.
We also demonstrate, rather counterintuitively, that there exists an optimal trans-
mission rate for a QKD system that exceeds the inverse of an individual detector’s
dead time.
The final project describes a new design for a free-space QKD link that centers
around faster silicon detectors. These detectors have a peak quantum efficiency in
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susceptible to solar interference. To mitigate this effect, the link is designed around
a Fraunhofer line in the solar spectrum where the background solar light levels are
reduced by up to 90%. By implementing this system, we expect at least a two-fold
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system compatible with first-generation ethernet technology.
NEW TECHNOLOGIES FOR
BROADBAND QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION:
SOURCES, DETECTORS, AND SYSTEMS
by
Daniel J. Rogers
Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment




Professor Julius Goldhar, Chair/Advisor








To Mim, who somehow kept me smiling throughout this whole crazy ordeal and who will
undoubtedly find every single spelling mistake in here.
And in memory of Nora, who I’m sure is reading this somewhere.
ii
Acknowledgments
”One man alone can be pretty dumb sometimes, but for real bona fide stupidity,
there ain’t nothin’ can beat teamwork.” -Edward Abbey
There are so many people without whom this whole adventure of graduate
school would not have been possible. First off, I must acknowledge the support and
encouragement from my dynamic duo of advisors, Charles Clark and Julius Goldhar.
They have pushed me to succeed while simultaneously holding me to the highest
standards. I must also acknowledge the support of Michael Coplan at every step of
the way, ensuring that I get the most out of my graduate career and indulging (even
sometimes supporting) even my most whimsical choices as a student.
I should acknowledge the generosity of my sponsors through my graduate pro-
gram, including the NIST/Chemical Physics Fellowship, the Department of Home-
land Security Science and Technology Graduate Fellowship, and the Ann G. Wylie
Dissertation Grant from the Graduate School, all of which allowed me to pursue the
topics that were most interesting to me and focus entirely on my studies.
I also must thank those individuals who have generously helped me along
the way, though they may have had no personal stake in my success. First off,
I appreciate the generous assistance of Chris Richardson, Victor Yun, Yongzhang
Leng, Joe DiPasquale, and Jon Sugrue at LPS. At NIST, I sincerely thank my
partners in crime, Josh Bienfang, Alessandro Restelli, and Jemellie Galang. I also
owe many thanks to Carl Williams, Alan Migdall, Jay Fan, Sergey Polyakov, Alex
iii
Ling, Matt Eisaman, Aaron Pearlman, Xiao Tang, Hai Xu, Lijun Ma, Alan Mink,
Tassos Nakassis, Barry Hershman, Gerry Fraser, Paul Lett, Trey Porto, and Carlos
Lopez-Mariscal. At Maryland, I must acknowledge the help of Mario Dagenais,
Chris Davis, and Edo Waks. I would also like to specifically mention all of the
crucial contributions from Tom Murphy, whose class and personal interest in my
work were critical to its success. In addition, I would like to thank Dr. Richard
Gray of Appalachian State University for generously sharing his expertise and Dr.
William Jeffrey for both his technical suggestions on the project and his personal
advice.
Of course, none of this would have ever made it through the administrative
straits without the tireless help of Helen Felrice and Debbie Jenkins. I suspect that
it is truly they who keep the Earth spinning on a daily basis.
I must also mention the support of my graduate school comrades, Brooke,
Mandy, Craig, Ching-Yee, Yi-Hsing, and Sophia, without whom I probably would
have thrown in the towel early on.
Lastly, I must thank my family - Mom, Dad, Bethy, Jonny, Dan, Sarah, Ricky
and Lucy. You have provided me with the inspiration and motivation to succeed
even when faced with the toughest of challenges.
iv
Table of Contents
List of Abbreviations vii
1 Introduction to Broadband Quantum Key Distribution 1
1.1 QKD - Why? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 The Fundamentals of QKD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Broadband QKD and its Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2 Birefringent phase-matched four wave mixing in a semiconductor waveguide
for correlated photon generation 11
2.1 Sources of correlated and entangled photons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 Birefringent phase-matched four wave mixing . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2.1 Linear and nonlinear optics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2.2 Third-order processes and four wave mixing . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.2.3 Parametric gain, photon correlation, and spontaneous pair
generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.2.4 Birefringent phase matching and the cross-polarized suscepti-
bility tensor element . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.2.5 Figure of merit and the effects of linear and nonlinear loss . . 33
2.3 Device design and fabrication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.3.1 Wavelength and material selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.3.2 Birefringence and detuning estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.3.3 Form birefringence, layer structure, and feature size determi-
nation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.3.4 Device fabrication and X-ray analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.4 Tests of birefringence, loss, and nonlinearity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.4.1 Birefringence measurements and further modeling . . . . . . . 52
2.4.2 The PPLN pump source . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.4.3 Detector calibration procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
2.4.4 Preliminary four wave mixing measurements . . . . . . . . . . 66
2.4.5 Modified source and subsequent four wave mixing measurements 71
2.4.6 Expected 4WM efficiency and corresponding observations . . . 73
2.4.7 Linear and nonlinear loss measurements . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
2.4.8 Practical implications of observed inefficiency . . . . . . . . . 85
2.4.9 Pump probe measurements and thermal effects . . . . . . . . 86
2.5 Results and further work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
2.5.1 Current results and open questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
2.5.2 Further nonlinearity and correlation measurements . . . . . . 92
2.5.3 From correlation to entanglement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
2.6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
v
3 Detector Dead-Time Effects and Paralyzability in Broadband QKD 98
3.1 Problems encountered in the high-speed regime . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
3.2 Secure high-speed QKD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
3.3 A Monte-Carlo simulation of QKD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
3.4 The sifted bit rate in high-speed QKD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
3.5 Hardware approaches to addressing dead time effects . . . . . . . . . 120
3.6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
4 High-speed QKD in the Hα Fraunhofer Window 124
4.1 Speed limits in broadband QKD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
4.2 The origin of timing jitter in Geiger mode avalanche photodiodes . . 127
4.3 Josef von Fraunhofer and the Hα line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
4.4 Free-space optical communication in the Fraunhofer window . . . . . 135
4.5 Single-photon sources at 656 nm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
4.6 Sub-clock gating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
4.7 Performance projections using MODTRAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
5 Conclusions - The future of broadband QKD 153
5.1 Advances in sources, detectors, and systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
5.2 Personal contributions to each project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
5.3 The future of free-space and fiber optic QKD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
5.4 QKD in the marketplace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
A Index of refraction calculation for aluminum gallium arsenide 159
B Monte-Carlo QKD Simulation Code 168
B.1 Traditional BB84 protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168







BB84 Bennett and Brassard, 1984 QKD Protocol
B92 Bennett, 1992 QKD Protocol
BBS Blum Blum Shub
CW Continuous Wave
E91 Ekert 1991 Protocol
EA Electro-Absorption
EC/PA Error Correction and Privacy Amplification
EO Electro-Optic
FEC Forward Error Correction
FPGA Field Programmable Gate Array
GEO Geostationary Earth Orbit
GVD Group Velocity Dispersion
LEO Low Earth Orbit
MBE Molecular Beam Epitaxy
MBPS Megabits per second
MPD Micro Photon Devices
PRNG Pseudo-random number generator
QBER Quantum Bit Error Rate
QKD Quantum Key Distribution
RHEED Reflection High Energy Electron Diffraction
RNG Random Number Generator
SPAD Single-Photon Avalanche Detector
SPCM Single-Photon Counting Module
SSPD Superconducting Single Photon Detector
TTL Transistor-Transistor Logic
VCSEL Vertical Cavity Surface Emitting Laser
vii
Chapter 1
Introduction to Broadband Quantum Key Distribution
”The speed of communications is wondrous to behold. It is also true that speed can
multiply the distribution of information that we know to be untrue.” -Edward R.
Murrow
1.1 QKD - Why?
The year is 47 BC. Four Roman Legions sit poised atop a hill overlooking
the Turkish town of Zile. The generals await word from their brilliant commander,
Julius Caesar, to end the coup led by Pharnaces, the well-known enemy of Rome.
Suddenly, a messenger appears carrying a small parchment. At first glance, Caesar’s
orders look to be gibberish, but the generals quickly rewrite the note, replacing each
letter with the one that occurs three before it in the alphabet. Suddenly the message
becomes clear: begin the attack. They shout orders to their lieutenants and begin a
five-day siege that lays waste to Pharnces’ 20,000 warriors. Caesar, satisfied that he
has crushed the coup, writes to Amantius in Rome, ”I came, I saw, I conquered.”[36]
Caesar’s simple shift cipher that he used to communicate with his generals
was surprisingly secure. Even in Caesar’s time, people had yet to develop the art of
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codebreaking, and most of Caesar’s enemies were not even able to read Latin writing.
Records indicate that it wasn’t until the 9th century that Arab mathematicians
developed the kind of cryptanalysis that could have compromised Caesar’s messages
[59]. However, once they did, the cat-and-mouse game between the codemakers and
the codebreakers began.
In today’s information-centric world, data encryption is ubiquitous. Anyone
who buys a book online using their credit card understands the importance of data
security. But we often take for granted that little padlock icon in the corner of our
browser window. What does it mean, and will it always remain secure?
Most of today’s encryption depends primarily on two steps: public key encryp-
tion to exchange a key between two parties, and a symmetric cipher that uses this
key to encrypt the data. Both of these steps must be secure in order to maintain
data integrity. Assuming the key is secret, we can say that the symmetric cipher step
is relatively safe given modern technology. While it is by no means unbreakable, it
does well against most publicly known computer hardware. The vulnerability comes
when the key is stolen, allowing an eavesdropper to steal the symmetric ciphertext
and decrypt it. Public-key encryption is based on the assumption that computers
cannot efficiently factor a large prime number (or perform a logarithm modulo-n,
which is an equivalent algorithmic problem). However, no one has yet proven that
this is true. It is possible that we can wake up tomorrow morning and find that a
clever mathematician or computer scientist somewhere has thought of an efficient
way to do so, compromising all of our online financial transactions, not to mention
various other sensitive government, military, and health care data. In fact, comput-
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ers based on quantum mechanical bits are already being developed that have been
shown to be able break public-key encryption [58].
So what can we do? Can we end this cat-and-mouse game that has been going
on since the time of Caesar and keep our data secure beyond the first quantum
computer? In some ways, we already have, and have done so since World War I.
In 1917, a telephone engineer by the name of Gilbert Vernam devised a scheme to
encrypt data using a string of random digits [68]. The fundamental idea is this:
Consider your message to be a sequence of binary digits (as all messages can be
thought of). Now write down a string of random digits (1’s and 0’s) that is exactly as
long as the message itself; this will be the key. Now, bit by bit, perform an addition
modulo-2 (also known as an exclusive OR, or XOR). The subsequent ciphertext
now looks like a string of random digits, and without knowledge of the key, the
encrypted message seems to contain no information. In fact, Claude Shannon later
showed that this text does indeed contain zero information without the key and
cannot be broken [54]. Of course, if you do know the key, you can simply subtract
it (another bitwise XOR operation) and retrieve the original message. It is a truly
unbreakable encryption scheme now known as the Vernam cipher or one-time pad.
So it seems that, by 1949, we had ended this cat-and-mouse game. But there
remained a problem that has plagued the Vernam cipher since its invention. How
does one transmit the key from the sender to the receiver without it being stolen? It
turns out that this is just as difficult as sending the message itself; it is, after all, a
string of digits exactly as long as original message. This problem essentially rendered
the Vernam cipher useless until 1984, when Bennett and Brassard realized that one
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can exploit the quirky principles of quantum mechanics to transmit a random key
and guarantee that it remains secret for the duration of its trip1 [6].
1.2 The Fundamentals of QKD
The fundamental procedure for what is commonly called BB84 (after Bennett
and Brassard’s 1984 paper) QKD goes as follows [6]: Suppose our sender (we’ll
call her Alice) wants to send a secret, binary message to her friend, whom we
will call Bob. To do so, she would like to use a Vernam cipher, so before she
encrypts her message, she will perform a joint quantum optics experiment with Bob
in order to agree on a secret, random key. She begins by setting up a channel that
can send single photons to Bob. These single photons will be sent in one of four
quantum states, organized into two pairs of non-orthogonal bases, each containing
two orthogonal states that represent the values 1 and 0, respectively. The simplest
implementation uses polarization state encoding on the single photon. For example,
the states |H〉, |V 〉, |+45〉, and |−45〉 are commonly used, where |H〉 and |+45〉
represent a bit value of 0, while |V 〉 and |−45〉 represent a bit value of 1. Alice then
makes two random choices: First, she chooses a basis to use (either H-V or ± 45).
She then chooses a random bit value and sends a single photon encoded in one of
the four states corresponding to her random choice.
Bob now prepares to measure the incoming photon. Since we are using po-
larization state encoding, this involves choosing a basis in which to measure the
1The original inspiration for quantum key distribution came out of ideas on quantum coding
expressed by Stephen Wiesner and published at the behest of Charles Bennett in [72]
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photon’s polarization (Bob and Alice agree beforehand which basis options they
will choose between). Bob makes a completely random choice here. He will ei-
ther measure the photon’s polarization in the same basis in which Alice sent it and
presumably obtain the same bit value that Alice sent, or he will measure it in the
wrong basis and have a 50% probability of measuring the opposite bit value. Bob
makes his measurement, and then, over an open, classical communication channel,
he announces to Alice what basis he used in his measurement. If Alice responds
(again over the open classical channel) that she used that same basis to transmit
the photon, then Bob keeps his measured bit value and they repeat the process
again. If they disagree on the bases used in transmission and measurement, Bob
simply discards his measurement result and they repeat the process. This process
is referred to as sifting and results in what is termed the sifted key.
Note that, even though they communicate basis choices on an open, classical
channel, no information about the actual key bits is revealed thus far. Now suppose
a nefarious eavesdropper (we will, of course, call her Eve), tries to intercept the
photons on their way from Alice to Bob. The first line of defense against such an
ignoble action is the simple fact that Alice only sent one photon. By definition, one
photon cannot be split in half, so Eve would have to intercept the photon, measure
it the same way Bob does, and send a new photon to Bob to replace the one she
stole. In doing so, she must make the same random measurement choice that Bob
does. This means that 50% of the time, she will make an incorrect basis choice and
send Bob a photon in a different basis than Alice originally transmitted. 50% of that
time, Bob will choose the correct basis, and finally, 50% of the final measurements
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will have incorrect bit values. The final result is that there will be up to a 12.5%
error rate per basis, resulting in an overall 25% maximum error rate in the sifted
key in the presence of an eavesdropper.
The final step in the quantum key exchange occurs when Alice and Bob have
an open conversation over the classical channel comparing their sifted key values.
Under the most stringent assumption that all errors introduced in the sifted key are
the result of an eavesdropper, Alice and Bob perform forward error correction to
eliminate the discrepancies in their respective keys. While the details of FEC are
irrelevant to this thesis (for a more in-depth discussion of error-correction codes, see
[14], [45], or [28]), the important feature is that Alice and Bob can eliminate the
portions of the sifted key that are in error without revealing any bits from the por-
tions of the key that they keep. This process, known collectively as error correction
and privacy amplification or reconciliation, results in a key that is guaranteed to
be secure from eavesdroppers, also known as the secret key. This entire process is
performed until the secret key is as long as the message itself. At that point, it can
safely be used as the key for a one time pad encryption and secure transmission of
the message over the open, classical channel.
It is apparent that this QKD concept seems to achieve the ultimate goal in data
security - to end the cat-and-mouse game that has dogged cryptography for over two
thousand years. However, there are a number of details that must be clarified when
discussing the security of QKD. First of all, along with the postulate that a single
quanta cannot be split by definition, the security proof depends on the no-cloning
theorem of Wooters and Zurek[73]. This theorem states that an unknown quantum
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state cannot be cloned without first measuring (and hence destroying) the original
state. This result is critical to the security of QKD, as an unknown quantum state
is precisely what Eve encounters in her attack on the QKD link. It also must be
noted that QKD links are still susceptible to the so-called denial of service attacks.
In fact, if the error rate increases beyond a certain point, the error-correcting codes
can break down and reconciliation cannot occur [9]. Furthermore, when this system
is implemented using real sources and detectors, further security threats come into
play that must be dealt with if quantum cryptography is to be practical. These
extensions will be discussed in Chapter 3.
It should also be noted that there are other schemes for implementing QKD.
One is a variation on BB84, called B92 (after Bennett’s 1992 paper describing it)
that involves only two non-orthogonal quantum states [7]. While this protocol is
simpler to implement in hardware, it does sacrifice efficiency. There is also a protocol
devised by Artur Ekert in 1991 that uses the exotic properties of nonclassical light
[17]. This protocol will be discussed further in Chapter 2.
1.3 Broadband QKD and its Limitations
While the underlying protocol behind quantum key distribution seems straight-
forward, actually implementing the process in a practical way proves to be a chal-
lenge that the community is still striving to achieve. Concerning practicality, I
refer generally to creating an ultra-secure data link over out-of-earshot distances
at speeds compatible with the modern telecommunications infrastructure. A good
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speed benchmark for a typical QKD link might be a secret key rate in excess of 10
Mb/s in order to be compatible with first-generation ethernet hardware. A number
of links, including ones at NIST, have begun to approach this secret key rate [9],
[75], [63].
The commonly accepted distance benchmark is the range from the ground to a
low-earth orbit (LEO) satellite. This metric derives from the concept of operations
involving secure quantum key transfer between a ground station, a LEO satellite,
and another ground station somewhere else on the globe. Assuming the satellite
can store the key securely, this arrangement, along with its cousin involving multiple
GEO satellites, is viewed as the most promising model for a global, secure, quantum
communications network [48].
A number of advances have begun to demonstrate the feasibility of perform-
ing such quantum data transfers [69]. Most of these efforts have focused on link
distance as the most obvious metric, including a recent demonstration of quantum
key exchange over the distance of 144 km between two of the Canary Islands [53].
While the link range is rather impressive, the experiment in [53] only operated at
a secret key rate of about 13 bits per second. Considering the limited time window
in which a LEO satellite is overhead, this is not yet a practical demonstration. Fast
key rates on the order of 10 Mb/s are required for any meaningful key exchange
between a ground station and a LEO satellite [10], [50].
Hence our focus in the NIST QKD effort has been to achieve truly broadband
quantum key distribution. We demonstrated in 2004 a system that exchanged secret
key at > 1 Mb/s, fast enough to transmit quantum-encrypted streaming video
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over a distance of 700 m. To achieve this, we incorporated a number techniques
from classical telecommunications engineering to more efficiently perform the steps
involved in the BB84 protocol. For example, we clocked the transmitter at 1.25 GHz,
using as our source high-speed, gain-switched VCSELs to create very short, weak
laser pulses. We implemented all of the control and sifting processes on a dedicated
FPGA and custom PCI card, and we optimized and multithreaded the FEC and
reconciliation procedures to make them more efficient [9]. However, in building this
link around these cutting-edge technologies, we encountered a fundamental speed
limit in the system: Timing jitter in the single photon APDs.
Avalanche photodiodes biased to operate in Geiger mode, transmit an electri-
cal pulse for each photon absorbed in the active semiconductor region (with some
efficiency, of course). Where in the absorption region of the device the photon is
absorbed creates fundamental uncertainty between the clocked photon transmission
and the time at which the SPAD sends its TTL pulse. This uncertainty, known
as timing jitter is about 550 ps at 3 dB for the most common commercial SPADs
2. Because one cannot transmit photons faster than the inverse of the jitter, the
transmission speed is limited. More detail on techniques to overcome this limitation
will be discussed in Chapter 4.
This thesis addresses a number of hurdles associated with making faster QKD
links. As mentioned above, Chapter 2 addresses sources of entanglement for QKD
2Because error rates can significantly increase when pulses are miscounted in adjacent clock bins,
a better measure of the timing jitter for this application is the 1/100 point. For the commercial
SPAD units, this can be as long as 2.5 ns [9].
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schemes that exploit the often-counterintuitive properties of quantum states of light.
QKD systems of this nature are fundamentally more secure than their counterparts
that use attenuated lasers. Chapter 2 will delve into the reasoning behind this asser-
tion and describe a project that examines a semiconductor source of correlated and
ultimately entangled photons. This effort also provides insight into some fundamen-
tal questions in nonlinear optics that still remained open. Chapter 3 then examines
what happens to the security of broadband QKD when implemented using real de-
tectors. In addition to an intrinsic timing jitter as described above, SPADs also
exhibit a recovery time that is often much longer than the transmission period. We
discuss the security implications of operating in this regime, propose a modification
to the BB84 protocol to mitigate these effects and provide results that show the
existence of an optimal transmission rate in excess of the inverse of the detector’s
recovery time. Finally, in Chapter 4 we put forth a design for a new free-space QKD
system at a wavelength that overlaps with a Fraunhofer line in the solar spectrum.
Based on newly available SPADs with reduced timing jitter, this system promises to
have an increased secret key rate of at least twice the previous demonstration, ap-
proaching the milestone of compatibility with first-generation ethernet connections.
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Chapter 2
Birefringent phase-matched four wave mixing in a semiconductor
waveguide for correlated photon generation
”God does not play dice with the universe; He plays an ineffable game of his own
devising, which might be compared, from the perspective of any of the other players,
to being involved in an obscure and complex version of poker in a pitch dark room,
with blank cards, for infinite stakes, with a dealer who won’t tell you the rules, and
who smiles all the time.” -Terry Pratchett
2.1 Sources of correlated and entangled photons
The BB84 QKD protocol described in Chapter 1 is only a semi-classical ap-
proximation of the absolute security that truly quantum communication can pro-
vide. Often called a prepare and send method for obvious reasons, it requires that
Alice makes two initial random choices before even introducing any quanta into the
scheme. Thus the cryptosystem, like nearly all others, is limited by the quality
of Alice’s random number generator. The NIST system, for example, relies on a
Mersenne Twister [40] pseudo-random number generator to create Alice’s random
bits. The Mersenne Twister is computationally fast and is often used for Monte-
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Carlo simulations, but from a security perspective it is considered unsuitable for
cryptography because it only requires observation of 624 iterates to determine all
of the parameters needed to predict its next output bit [40]. While the EC/PA
process mitigates the problem to some degree, the PRNG is certainly the weakest
link in the NIST QKD system. One obvious solution would be to use a more secure
PRNG. However, the current standard in cryptographically secure random bits is
the Blum Blum Shub algorithm [11]. Like all modern classical cryptography, BBS
relies on the product of two large prime numbers to produce random bits. Because
QKD is meant to protect against attackers equipped with potential fast factoring
capabilities, it would be quite counterproductive to base the random bit choices on
a PRNG susceptible to a factoring attack.
As mentioned briefly in Chapter 1, there is an alternative to the prepare and
send QKD protocols. A protocol based on entanglement, first proposed by Artur
Ekert in 1991[17] and called the E91 protocol, involves creating a pair of polarization-
entangled photons in a Bell state and sending one photon of the pair to Alice and
one to Bob. Alice and Bob then simultaneously measure their respective photons
using the same procedure that Bob uses in the BB84 protocol. Since the photons are
polarization entangled, the measurement outcomes are correlated and can be used
to generate random keys in two different places. This method (and others based on
entanglement of properties other than polarization, like time or frequency) has two
distinct advantages over prepare and send methods. First, the randomness between
the ones and zeros no longer depends on a quality PRNG. Instead, it is intrinsic to
the physical state of the photon pair and is as truly random as possible in nature.
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Second, the security of the information, as far as the laws of quantum mechanics are
understood, is unequivocally guaranteed. That is, in prepare and send schemes, one
must always worry about side channels of information. For example, information
about which photon state Alice sent might be gleaned by analyzing the timing
information, looking at RF leakage from the drive electronics, or monitoring some
other overlooked detail of the system. However, because of the nature of quantum
entanglement, one can guarantee that, if the photons violate the Bell inequality,
there can be no information leaked through any side channel, even ones that are
unknown to Alice and Bob (or anyone else, for that matter). For more details about
this concept, see [3], [5], and [4].
While entangled photons offer the path to truly unbreakable encryption, they
still present challenges, namely in ways to generate them quickly and efficiently.
Currently the most ubiquitous method for generating entanglement involves type II
parametric downconversion in a BBO crystal [32]. This method has been demon-
strated as a source for E91 QKD up to the kb/s range [39]. However, this source
is limited to these slow speeds and requires bulk optical crystals pumped with free-
space beams. Thus there is a strong interest in a source of entanglement that is
compact, integrated, and able to operate at GHz pair generation rates.
There are a number of approaches to integrated sources of entangled pairs.
For example, many groups are investigating third order nonlinearities in silicon
nanowires [22], [55]. In these devices, the sub-wavelength dimensions of the waveg-
uide allow the modal dispersion to be tailored to achieve phase matching [65]. How-
ever, because they are so small, they can potentially have high linear loss and be
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very difficult to couple to efficiently. Another approach uses four wave mixing in a
microstructure optical fiber to generate correlated and entangled pairs [19], [46], [70].
In this scheme, the small mode confinement and long propagation length compen-
sates for the relatively small third-order susceptibility of glass. Unlike Si nanowires,
this source has an additional advantage of having very low linear loss. Other exotic
schemes involve second order processes in highly birefringent III-V semiconductor
waveguides [20], as well as a host of other approaches.
Each approach has its respective advantages and disadvantages. For example,
in certain materials, the second order nonlinearity is quite strong, promising good
pair generation efficiency. However, in second order processes, the signal-idler de-
tuning is on the order of the pump wavelength, so creating integrated devices that
guide well across such a broad spectral range is rather difficult. Hence third order
processes are preferred for integrated devices. However, correlated pair generation
from four photon mixing is often masked by strong, uncorrelated Raman scattering,
and groups working with these devices have gone to great lengths to eliminate this
source of noise [34].
It should be noted that compact, integrated sources of entangled photon pairs
have utility beyond quantum communications. For example, these devices can en-
able compact two photon interferometers for better optical sensing applications [57],
comprise sources for linear optical quantum computing, or be used in correlated pho-
ton metrology [42]. Of course, as with many quantum information technologies, the
most likely ’killer’ applications are the ones that have not yet been imagined.
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2.2 Birefringent phase-matched four wave mixing
As mentioned above, one of the main drawbacks to third-order processes for
entanglement generation is noise generated by Raman scattering. As Lin, et al.,
point out in their 2006 paper, one way to mitigate this effect is to generate signal
and idler pairs at the opposite polarization to the pump [35]. They show that the
Raman gain is insignificant at the orthogonal polarization. This polarization diver-
sity scheme has the added benefit of making it simpler to separate the signal-idler
pair from the pump with only a polarizer on the output. Per the proposal of Lin, et
al., we examine and demonstrate third-order nonlinearity in a semiconductor waveg-
uide using birefringent phase matching in order to generate correlated photon pairs
without the Raman noise. Furthermore, because the material that we investigate
is a crystalline semiconductor, the Raman noise generated is narrow band, as op-
posed to the broadband Raman noise produced in glass devices, further reducing
the interference from uncorrelated processes.
2.2.1 Linear and nonlinear optics
Before we present the details of the device, it behooves us to briefly review
the theory of nonlinear optics in general and four wave mixing in particular1. We
begin by considering a simple atom, comprised of a nucleus and an electron cloud,
in the presence of a time-dependent electric field. This system can be approximated
1This treatment is very cursory. For a much more detailed treatment of the nonlinear suscep-
tibility tensors, coupled wave equations, etc., see [13].
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by a mass on a spring, where the restoring force of the spring is analogous to the
Coulomb force that the electron experiences in the presence of the field. At first,
we will assume that this force is linear in the displacement. Like any good physics
derivation, we begin with Newton’s second law [43],
F = ma = mẍ(t) = −eE(t)− kx(t)− 2mγẋ(t) (2.1)
where the first term is the driving force, the second term is the restoring force, the
third term represents a damping loss term. Rearranging terms, we obtain the linear
differential equation







is defined as the natural oscillation frequency. If we assume that the




−iωt + c.c., then the AC steady state response of the atom is
x(t) =
eE0
2m (Ω2 − 2iγω − ω2)
e−iωt + c.c. (2.3)
Now that we know the response, consider a medium consisting of a large number
of these atoms in an isotropic, uniform distribution (for example, an atomic vapor),
with number density N . In such a medium, the macroscopic polarization of the
material in one dimension is defined as
P (t) = −Nex(t) (2.4)
where the factor of ex(t) represents the dipole moment of each individual atom.
Substituting the solution in 2.3 into 2.4, we obtain
P (t) =
Ne2E0
2m (Ω2 − 2iγω − ω2)









m(Ω2−2iγω−ω2) . In the frequency domain, we can write this as
P̂ (ω) = ε0χ
(1)(ω)Ê(ω) (2.6)
where P̂ (ω) and Ê(ω) are the Fourier transforms of P (t) and E(t) respectively, and
χ(1) is defined as the linear susceptibility of the material. Since E(t) is monochro-
matic, we know from 2.6 that
P0 = ε0χ
(1)(ω)E0 (2.7)




m (Ω2 − 2iγω − ω2)
(2.8)
Now consider the case where the restoring force is no longer linear in the
displacement (as we know to be the case), but instead some arbitrary function. We
can expand this function into a Taylor series and incorporate it into the differential





3(t) + . . .
]
− 2mγẋ(t) (2.9)
Solving this nonlinear differential equation, we can write down the total polarization
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Until now our analysis has been entirely one-dimensional. Consider now the
case where the electric field and the polarization are full three-dimensional vectors.
In the linear case, 2.6 becomes
~P = ε0χ
(1) ~E (2.11)
where χ(1) is now a rank 2 tensor with nine elements. In full matrix notation, we




























Using the Einstein notation, where sums over repeating subscripts are implied, we






















where χ(2) and χ(3) are third and fourth rank tensors with 27 and 81 elements,
respectively. Also note that, for the purposes of this derivation, all waves were
assumed to be at one frequency, ω. When this is not valid (which is most of the
time), the susceptibilities would be functions of the various frequencies involved.
2.2.2 Third-order processes and four wave mixing
The second-order susceptibility is responsible for processes such as second
harmonic generation, parametric downconversion, and sum frequency generation,
among others. Because it involves three different wavelengths (hence the name three-
photon processes), and because conservation of energy dictates that the total photon
energy incident on the medium must equal the photon energy transmitted out of
the medium, the detuning between input and output wavelengths are often very
large, on the order of the wavelength itself. Additionally, because the second-order
susceptibility is related to the symmetric part of the restoring force (proportional to
x2), only materials that are non-centrosymmetric will exhibit second-order nonlinear
optical phenomena. Of the 32 crystal classes, only 21 fall into this category and will
have non-zero χ(2) elements. All others do not exhibit second-order or, in fact, any
even order behavior.
In this experiment we choose to focus on third-order processes for two reasons.
First, because of the nature of these four photon processes, the detuning between
input and output wavelengths can be much smaller. This helps in designing opti-
cal devices both because they do not have to operate over such a large spectrum
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and because achieving phase matching is significantly easier (this will be discussed
in more detail in the next section). In addition, all materials exhibit third-order
characteristics, opening up a larger field of possible materials with which to work.
One drawback to χ(3) processes, however, is that they are typically weaker than
second-order effects. Still, because phase matching is easier, it is possible to achieve
adequate interaction strength with simpler designs.
We will focus on the specific process of partially-degenerate four wave mixing,
where two photons at a pump wavelength are converted via the third-order nonlinear
susceptibility of the medium into two photons, generally called signal and idler pho-
tons, at frequencies slightly detuned longer and shorter than the pump wavelength.
To understand how this process occurs, consider again a centro-symmetric material
with an anharmonic response. Suppose, for simplicity, that a monochromatic plane
wave is incident on this material. Equation 2.9 still applies, albeit with k2 = 0. If
we take the perturbation approach, expanding x(t) = x(1)(t) + x(3)(t) + . . ., with





























. Subtracting 2.2 from 2.14, we obtain






















































The first term oscillates at three times the input frequency and is responsible for the
effect of third harmonic generation, while the second and third term oscillate at the
original input frequency. We can treat these two frequency components separately,
splitting the total polarization of the material into two parts, ~P (3)(3ω) and ~P (3)(ω).






















are related to the degeneracies and symmetries of the
susceptibility tensor [13]. The second expression represents the third-order contri-
bution to the material polarization at the input frequency ω. As there is also a
contribution from the linear polarization, this perturbation results in an effective
index of refraction that is proportional to the input field intensity, resulting in the
optical Kerr effect [13].
So far we have only examined the simple case where the input field is monochro-
matic. However, consider the case where the input field is composed of two closely
spaced frequencies, a pump at ωp and a signal at ωs = ωp + δ, with the component
at the pump frequency significantly stronger than the component at the signal fre-
quency. It is not difficult to see that the resulting third-order polarization will have
components oscillating at a number of different frequencies, including the pump fre-
quency, the signal frequency, the third harmonics of both frequencies, and a new
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frequency, called the idler frequency, at ωi = ωp − δ. This polarization component









It should be noted that, nominally, the fourth-rank tensor χ(3) has 81 elements.
However, under certain reasonable assumptions about the material properties, as
well as the symmetry properties of nonlinear susceptibility tensors, we can describe
the third-order susceptibility by only two numbers, χ(3)xxxx and χ
(3)
xxyy, where the
first number represents the strength of processes where the pump and signal are
co-polarized, and the second number represents the case where the two are cross-
polarized. Note that these assumptions are only valid for semiconductor materials
with cubic symmetry in spectral regions where they are essentially lossless. In fact,
in isotropic materials such as glass, we can reduce the tensor even further with
the relation χ(3)xxyy =
1
3
χ(3)xxxx. However, for the cubic semiconductors in which we
are interested for this experiment, there is no analytical relationship between the
two and we must rely on experimental measurements to determine the interaction
strength of cross-polarized processes.
In order to examine the behavior of the idler with respect to the other signals,
we must derive a set of coupled wave equations describing the joint evolution of the
electromagnetic fields as they propagate through the medium[70]. We begin with
Maxwell’s equations for a non-conducting, non-magnetic material,








5 · ~D = 0
5 · ~B = 0
Combining the first two, we obtain










We know that, by definition, ~D = ε0 ~E + ~P . Substituting, we obtain







The polarization, ~P = ~P (linear) + ~P (NL), can be written as separate linear and
nonlinear parts. If we consider only the nonlinear part of the polarization, then 2.22
simplifies to









With the nonlinear polarization described above, we can use this wave equation
to examine the evolution of the electromagnetic wave as it propagates through the





ikjz−ωjt + c.c. (2.24)
where j = p, s, i is the index of each component (pump, signal, and idler). Note
that the wave is factored into a slowly-varying envelope Aj(z), a transverse mode
U(x, y), and complex phasor. We make the following assumptions: First, that all
of the waves are co-polarized, allowing us to treat the field in one dimension; we
will revisit this assumption later. Second, we will assume that all U(x, y) are the
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same for each component of the field, which is a valid assumption for closely spaced
frequencies in a single-mode waveguide. Finally, we will assume that As, Ai  Ap,
that is, the pump field is much stronger than the signal and idler fields. This allow
for two simplifications - first, we can assume that the pump is undepleted by the
parametric process. Second, when considering the nonlinear polarization, we can
ignore any terms that result from the product of the signal and/or idler fields, only
keeping terms that involve products with the pump field. This results in three
expressions for the nonlinear polarization.
P (ωp) = ξp(t) |Ap|2Ap (2.25)
P (ωs) = σs
[
2 |Ap|2As + A2pA∗i ξs(t)
]
P (ωi) = σi
[
2 |Ap|2Ai + A2pA∗sξs(t)
]
where we have simplified the notation2 by incorporating all of the constants such
as the susceptibility, c, ε0, etc., into the respective σp,s,i and rewriting all of the
time-dependent phasors as the various ξp,s,i(t). Since we assume that the pump
remains undepleted throughout the process, the only term that remains is the one
responsible for self-phase modulation. In the polarizations of the signal and idler,
two terms remain significant - the cross-phase modulation from the pump signal,
represented by the first term, and the four-wave mixing term that is the subject of
this analysis.
We can now substitute 2.24 and 2.25 into 2.23 to obtain three differential equa-
tions describing the coupled evolution of the electromagnetic field as it propagates
2This notation is similar to that used in [70].
24
through the medium. Under the assumption that the envelopes Ap,s,i are slowly





This allows us to ignore all of the second-order derivatives. If we further assume
that the medium is lossless and that the phase-matching conditions are met (2kp −



























2 |Ap|2Ai + A2pA∗s
)















factors relating Ap to the pump power P0, we can show that the phase function φ(z)
in 2.28 can be written as
φ(z) = γP0z (2.29)
where γ = 2πn2
λAeff
is the nonlinear parameter indicating the strength of the nonlinear
interaction and Aeff is the effective mode area. This expression γP0z appears often
in parametric nonlinear processes. The parametric gain in four-wave mixing, as we
will show, is given by G = |γP0z|2. Since we are keen to deal in the regime where
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both the signal and idler signals are composed of single photons, we can make the
valid assumption that |γP0z|2  1 and that both the self-phase and cross-phase
modulation are small.
Using this solution in 2.28 and 2.29, we can reduce the number of coupled
equations from three to two, allowing us to write, to first-order approximation, the
following coupled equations describing the evolution of the signal and idler beams:
dAs
dz





= −iγP0 (A∗s + Ai)





i ) = 0 (2.31)
d
dz
(As − A∗i ) = 2iγP0 (As + A∗i )
We can solve these differential equations to obtain
As(z) + A
∗
i (z) = As(0) + A
∗
i (0) (2.32)
As(z)− A∗i (z) = (As(0)− A∗i (0)) + 2iγP0z (As(0) + A∗i (0))
Solving for the signal and idler envelopes under the intitial conditions of As(0) = A0
and A∗i (0) = 0 gives us
As(z) = (1 + γP0z)A0 (2.33)
A∗i (z) = γP0zA0
Note that these expressions assume perfect phase matching, as well as co-polarization
of all of the beams. These assumptions will be revisited in later sections, but suffice
to say they are valid in understanding what is meant by correlated photons.
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2.2.3 Parametric gain, photon correlation, and spontaneous pair gen-
eration
From the coupled equations in 2.33, we can see, as indicated above, that the
parametric gain at the signal and idler wavelengths is the same. That is, for a
device of length L with an initial signal input of As(0) and a pump power of P0, the






The fact that these intensities increase by the same amount is a first indication of
what is meant by correlated photons. More deeply, however, we can consider what
happens to the coupled wave equations when we quantize the signal and idler fields
and consider them on the single-photon level. We define the signal and idler field

















i(kiz−ωit) + â†i (t)e
−i(kiz−ωit)
)
where V is the mode volume. Note that the creation and annihilation operators







[âi(t), âj(t)] = 0
for i, j = s, i. Since all of the waves are close together, we can make the assumption
that ωs ≈ ωi ≈ ωp = ω. Using this assumption, we can write the interaction
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Since we want to find the time-evolution of the field operators, we can use the



































































Solving these in a similar manner to the classical case above, we obtain
âs(t) = µâs(0) + νâ
†
i (0) (2.40)
â†i (t) = ν
∗âs(0) + µ
∗â†i (0)
where µ = 1− iγP0ct
n
and ν = −iγP0ct
n

































This implies that the difference in the number operators (defined as n̂j = â
†
j âj for
j = s, i) of the signal and idler fields n̂s(k, t)− n̂i(k, t) is a constant of motion. More
plainly, it indicates that whenever a signal photon is created, an idler photon will
be created as well. This is the fundamental meaning of correlated photon pairs.
In addition to their correlation, we must examine how these pairs can be
generated spontaneously. Using the solutions in 2.40, let us examine the case when
there is nothing but vacuum fluctuations present at signal and idler modes at z = 0.
Noting that âj â
†
j = 1̂, the vacuum matrix element of the signal number operator at
time t = nL
c










) ∣∣∣∣ 0s, 0i〉 (2.42)
= |ν|2 = |γP0L|2
Thus we can see that, even in the presence of nothing but vacuum fluctuations on
the signal input, signal photons are generated spontaneously. Additionally, since
we have shown that signal and idler photons are always generated in pairs, we
have established a mathematical basis for the spontaneous generation of correlated
photon pairs.3
3Classically, we can show from the Manley-Rowe relations [38] that the photon flux in each beam















, where Ip,s,i are the intensities of the pump,
signal, and idler beams respectively. However, by treating the beams quantum mechanically, we
can quantify a measure of the correlation, as we will do in later sections.
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2.2.4 Birefringent phase matching and the cross-polarized suscepti-
bility tensor element
In the derivation above, we have established that, under certain assumed con-
ditions, spontaneous pairs of correlated photons are generated via four-wave mixing.
However, a number of the assumptions made above are non-trivial. First, we as-
sumed that all of the waves are co-polarized. While violating this assumption does
not necessarily void the above result, it does change some of the interaction coef-
ficients. Specifically, the definitions of n2 and γ are based on the real part of the
tensor element χ(3)xxxx. If, for example, we used a process that involved pump photons
at one polarization interacting with signal and idler photons at another wavelength,
these parameters would have to be defined in terms of the χ(3)xxyy tensor element. In
an isotropic medium, such as a glass optical fiber, the relationship is well-known
to be χ(3)xxyy =
1
3
χ(3)xxxx. However, for cubic semiconductors such as Si, GaAs, and
AlGaAs, there is no analytical relationship. There are some experimental results







, but they range from 0.25 to over 0.9 and
are inconclusive [16], [21]. An estimate of this ratio is one of the immediate goals of
this project. For comparison, Table 2.1 compares the published n2 values for various
common optical materials.
While using interacting fields at orthogonal polarizations leads to uncertainty
in the strength of the interaction, it does offer a number of advantages in a practical
nonlinear device. From an experimental point of view, generating the signal and
idler orthogonal to the pump allows for easier elimination of the pump beam, starting
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Table 2.1: A comparison of the nonlinear refractive indices of different materials
[13], [19], [33]. Co-polarized processes are strongest in AlGaAs, but the strength of
cross-polarized processes is unknown.





with a simple polarizer on the output of the device. More importantly, however,
generating the signal and idler orthogonally polarized to the pump allows for better
elimination of Raman noise. As Lin, et al., point out in [35], the limiting factor in
most fiber-based entanglement generation systems is noise from broadband Raman
scattering in the medium. The Raman gain is mainly polarized in the direction of the
pump beam, with negligible Raman noise generated at the orthogonal polarization.
Hence they propose using birefringent phase matched four wave mixing as a way
to eliminate Raman noise in entanglement generation systems. For this reason,
we choose to focus our experiment on using birefringent phase-matched four-wave
mixing in a semiconductor waveguide as a method to generate entanglement without
interference from Raman noise.
Birefringent phase matching is certainly not a new idea [61]. However, it
has yet to be examined as a method to generate correlated pairs, especially in a
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semiconductor waveguide. It is not well established that birefringence is something
that is easily designed into a waveguide, as the typical goal of integrated photonics
design is to eliminate birefringence altogether. In addition, it is not obvious how to
use linearly co-polarized correlated photon pairs to generate entanglement. Though
ways do exist, whether they are practical and efficient has yet to be determined.
How does the approach of birefringent phase matching relate to the analysis
above? Recall that we assumed that the phase mismatch, ∆k = 2kp − ks − ki, was
zero, giving us a parametric gain of G = |γP0L|2. If ∆k 6= 0, then one can show
that the expression for parametric gain becomes












Because this additional factor approaches zero very rapidly for any ∆k 6= 0, it
becomes imperative that the system be designed such that the phase mismatch
is truly zero. This becomes the challenge in most nonlinear optics experiments
involving dispersive media, and many diverse approaches exist4. In the case of














The phase matching condition is tantamount to setting ∆k = 0 in this expression.
Note that the index of refraction at the x and y polarization are different and
wavelength-dependent.
4For a discussion of the various phase-matching techniques, including angle tuning, quasi-phase
matching, and dispersion tailoring, see [13] and [65].
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2.2.5 Figure of merit and the effects of linear and nonlinear loss
The above analysis assumes negligible linear loss and two-photon absorption.
The presence of significant absorption can strongly affect the correlated pair gen-
eration efficiency. To understand how these effects enter into the analysis, we can
introduce a measure of the correlation of changes in the signal and idler fields [24],
defined as
C =
〈n̂sn̂i〉 − 〈n̂s〉 〈n̂i〉
〈n̂2s〉 − 〈n̂2i 〉
(2.45)
In the absence of loss, this expression becomes C = |µ|
2
|ν|2+1 = 1. We can also compute
the value of C in the presence of linear loss. First, we redefine the creation and
annihilation operators to include linear loss:
b̂s,i =
√
ηâs,i + ξ̂ (2.46)
where η is a parameter representing linear loss (close to unity) and ξ̂ is the noise






= δi,j for i, j = s, i.




= 1− η. Using these new operators, we can
show that C becomes
C =
η2 |µ|2






η2 |ν|2 + 1
≈ η2 (2.47)
since we assume |ν|2 << 1. We see that the correlation scales with η2, and η is
close to but less than unity, so the photons become decorrelated quite quickly as
the linear loss increases.







where β is the 2PA coefficient. In this case, as the mean photon number increases
with the presence of significant 2PA, the correlation rapidly decreases.
To estimate the impact of 2PA on correlated photon generation, we can define







If f is greater than unity, then we can assume that 4WM will dominate 2PA and
the device will potentially be useful as a source of correlated photon pairs.
2.3 Device design and fabrication
2.3.1 Wavelength and material selection
In order to fabricate an actual device to perform 4WM, we must first select
a wavelength at which to operate. We determine the operating wavelength based
on the following criteria: First, that the system be compatible with Si SPADs. We
demand this simply because single-photon measurements are much more straightfor-
ward using Si SPADs than measurements made, for example, at C-band wavelengths
with cooled InGaAs detectors. Second, the operating wavelength must be compati-
ble with free-space quantum key distribution; that is, it must not fall within a water
absorption band in the atmosphere. Finally, we must select a wavelength for which
optics are available. Of the possibilities, the wavelength that best satisfies these
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criteria is 780 nm. It lies well within the efficient absorption spectrum of Si SPADs,
it propagates readily through the atmosphere (as shown in Figure 2.1), and it also
happens to be a rubidium absorption line, so optics are readily available at that
wavelength.
Having chosen 780 nm as the center wavelength for the device, we must choose
a semiconductor material that is transparent in that region. The obvious candidate
is aluminum gallium arsenide, the preferred photonic material for that wavelength.
The empirical relationship of the bandgap energy in eV to the aluminum content
for AlxGa1−xAs is given by[1]
Eg = 1.424 + 1.266x+ 0.26x
2 (2.50)
Using this expression, we can choose a material composition that is transparent at
780 nm, or a photon energy of 1.59 eV. We want this photon energy to be roughly
20% lower than the bandgap energy of the material. Solving backwards indicates
that a waveguide with roughly 30% aluminum should suffice, with a bandgap energy
of 1.798 eV. This choice of material serves as our starting point for designing the
device.
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Figure 2.1: A MODTRAN plot of the atmospheric transmission around 780 nm.
Note that the wavelength range of interest does not contain any water absorption
lines. For more details on MODTRAN, see chapter 4.
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2.3.2 Birefringence and detuning estimation
The next step in the design process involves choosing a range in which we
want to generate photon pairs, and determining the birefringence required to achieve
such pump-signal detuning. In order to make this determination, we can use the
temperature-dependent Sellmeier equations of Gehrsitz, et al.[23], for AlGaAs with
arbitrary aluminum content. The full calculation of the index of refraction as a
function of the wavelength, aluminum content, and temperature is not trivial. An
implementation of the calculation in MATLAB compatible C code is included in
Appendix A. We can use this code, along with the expression for the phase mismatch
in 2.44, to estimate the birefringence required to achieve phase matching. Setting













where n(λ) is the Sellemeir equation for bulk AlGaAs from [23], assuming 30% alu-
minum at a temperature of 300 K. A plot of this curve is shown in Figure 2.2. Of
course, this calculation makes a number of assumptions, the most cavalier (though
not unreasonable) assumes that the birefringence is constant with wavelength. Still,
the plot in Figure 2.2 provides us with at least an estimate of the range of birefrin-
gence to which we must design the device.
When choosing the pair generation wavelengths, we must consider both ex-
perimental practicalities and proper operation device. As the detuning decreases,
we are limited by the ability to experimentally separate the pump, signal, and idler
photons in the spectral domain. This ostensibly limits the detuning to at least 3
37
nm, implying the device should have a birefringence of at least δn = 10−4. In the
other direction, we wish to avoid noise due to Raman interference, one of the moti-
vations behind pursuing a birefringent process. One advantage of using a crystalline
semiconductor over an amorphous glass is the strong localization of the Raman
spectrum. Data outlined in Holtz, et al.[27], suggests that AlGaAs has LO phonon
peaks at approximately 300 cm−1, which corresponds to peaks between 10 and 20
nm detuned from a 780 nm pump. Hence when designing our device, we should limit
the pump-signal detuning to less than the detuning of the Raman peaks5. From the
plot in Figure 2.2, we see that the upper bound on our detuning implies that the
device birefringence should remain less than δn = 10−3.
5It is preferable, at least for optical fibers, to operate at detunings smaller than the Raman
scattering peaks, as outside the Raman band the nonlinear gain for four photon mixing is lower
[35]. It is also desirable to have smaller detunings since designing a waveguide for closely-spaced
wavelengths is much more straightforward.
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Figure 2.2: A plot of the required birefringence to achieve perfect phase matching
as a function of the desired pump-signal detuning. The calculations show that
the phasematching is sensitive primarily to the birefringence - the precise pump
wavelength has little effect on the curve.
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2.3.3 Form birefringence, layer structure, and feature size determi-
nation
The design requirements dictate that the detuning fall within the range of
10−4 < δn < 10−3. This range of values is rather small in the context of integrated
photonics and is on the order of the birefringence observed in AlGaAs waveguides
due simply to strain in the material[66]. It is not trivial to design a waveguide with
such a small but precisely defined birefringence. In fact, often the goal of integrated
photonic designs is to eliminate birefringence altogether. Hence one of the primary
goals of this project is to demonstrate the ability to design a waveguide with a
small but predictable and controllable birefringence. To do this, the most obvious
approach is to use the property of form birefringence. This phenomenon occurs
when a material consists of layers of alternating index of refraction. Consider a
structure consisting of alternating layers of different bulk isotropic materials A and
B, where material A has layer thickness tA and index nA, and material B has layer
thickness tB and index nB. The structure is depicted in Figure 2.3. Given this
composite material, the induced birefringence from the alternating layers is given
by









where no and ne are the ordinary and extraordinary indices of refraction of the






are the fractional thicknesses
of the A and B layers[12].
Using this concept, we can create a device with a core region that consists
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of alternating layers with slightly different aluminum content, creating an artificial
birefringence that is controllable by the material properties. In addition, if we use a
rib waveguide (which is the simplest waveguide design and the one that we will use),
we can have further control over the birefringence by varying the width of the rib
and thus controlling the aspect ratio of the guided mode. However, this results in a
tradeoff between higher birefringence and less efficient input and output coupling;
the efficiency is controlled by the overlap integral of the mode with a presumably
gaussian beam, and a high aspect ratio mode results in a smaller coupling efficiency.
Hence the goal is to create a birefringent mode with an aspect ratio as close to unity
as possible.
There is another limitation on the feature size in addition to the mode prop-
erties. Because of the sensitivity of correlated pair generation to linear loss, the
device must be designed to have as low a linear loss as possible while still remaining
single mode. The lower limit on feature size is a product of limitations in the etch-
ing process during fabrication; exposure of the mask and the chemical etch process
create features with roughness on the sidewalls. Hence it is good practice to limit
the waveguide to a 2 µm rib width in order to maintain good guiding properties.
In addition, we choose to design the device so that the mode is guided beneath the
device surface in order to further mitigate losses due to surface roughness.
The last design consideration when laying out the waveguides is the very prac-
tical one of cost. As mentioned above, rib waveguides are the simplest designs to
fabricate. Thus we choose to pursue designs based on this waveguide structure. The
more important consideration, however, is the cost of the mask. Masks are one of
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the most expensive components in semiconductor fabrication, so the ability to use
an existing mask significantly reduces the cost and time of fabrication. Because of
the risky nature of this project, we chose to base our design upon an existing mask,
shown in Figure 2.4. This mask consists of ribs that vary from 2.0 to 7.0 µm in
0.5 µm steps, allowing us to test a range of devices until we find one that has the
proper birefringence.
All of these considerations were taken into account and put into the design
model. We simulated a myriad of various layer structures and finally settled on
the device design shown in Figure 2.5. The structure is relatively simple to grow
via molecular beam epitaxy, involving only various alloys of AlGaAs. The layer
thicknesses are controllable in MBE to within monolayers, providing much finer
precision than necessary. The aluminum concentrations can vary during the process
and must be calibrated but are nominally controllable to within a few percent. More
important, the relative aluminum concentrations that are critical to determining the
form birefringence can be controlled to greater accuracy than the absolute aluminum
concentrations.
This layer structure was verified by computional modeling to have the proper
birefringence for devices ranging from 2 to 7 µm. A solution for the lowest order
mode, from the OWMS commercial mode solving software, is shown in Figure 2.6.
Plots of the birefringence versus rib width are shown in Figure 2.7. The plots show
that the devices should have a birefringence within the desired range, while guiding
only a single mode with a reasonably small aspect ratio.
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Figure 2.3: A cartoon of a material with form birefringence, consisting of alternating





Figure 2.4: A partial schematic of the mask used to fabricate the chip. The chip
consists of a series of waveguides of different rib widths (indicated by the numbers,
in microns).
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Figure 2.5: The layer structure settled on during modeling, showing a multi-layer
birefringent core buried 100 nm beneath the surface. The lateral confinement is
achieved by a rib above the core. Varying this rib width changes the overall bire-
fringence of the mode.
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Figure 2.6: An image of the computed lowest order mode generated by OWMS.
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Figure 2.7: A plot of a sample of OWMS modeling results, showing the computed
birefringence for various rib widths and core thicknesses. The modeling indicates
that we can expect a birefringence in the target range using this structure.
47
2.3.4 Device fabrication and X-ray analysis
Given the design outlined above, the first step in the fabrication process in-
volved growing the material on a GaAs wafer using MBE6. Two superlattice layers
were first grown on the GaAs substrate and were used for calibrating the aluminum
content and growth rate using Reflection High Energy Electron Diffraction. RHEED
is a technique that uses electron diffraction from surfaces to calibrate the number
of monolayers present during growth; diffraction energy peaks when the surface is
covered with 50% of one monolayer and is at a minimum when the monolayer is
completely filled. By monitoring the oscillations in the RHEED energy, one can de-
termine the growth time required for one monolayer of material growth. The defect
count in the final growth was approximately 100 per sq. cm.
The material composition was verified using X-ray diffraction. As indicated
above, there is some uncertainty in the actual aluminum content achieved during
growth, but the relative percentages are very precisely controlled. Thus by verifying
the aluminum percentage of one layer, one can be reasonably sure that the aluminum
content of the other layers is shifted by the same amount. The X-ray data are shown
in Figure 2.8. They indicate (as explained in the caption) that the final aluminum
content is only 3% higher than intended in the recipe.
The device patterning was performed using a photoresist pattern and a chlorine-
6The fabrication of the device was perform by the very adept Dr. Chris Richardson in the
state-of-the-art III-V semiconductor fabrication facilities located at the Laboratory for Physical
Sciences in College Park, MD. The information in this section is adapted from his report, located
at http://www.quantumcollective.org.
48
based etch in an inductively coupled plasma etch tool. The final devices have widths
of 2.15, 2.62, 3.11, 4.7, 5.1, 5.7, and 6.2 µm, as measured by scanning electron mi-
croscopy. An SEM image of the 2.5 µm device is shown in Figure 2.9.
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Figure 2.8: X-ray diffraction data from measurements of the final growth. The
technique involves measuring the diffracted X-ray power as a function of the angle of
incidence on the wafer and essentially determines the lattice constant. The data are
interpreted by computing an expected curve based on the intended growth recipe,
then modifying the layer contents in the model until it fits reasonably well with
the experimental data. The peak on the left is from the cladding layers, which
dominate the diffraction due to their relatively large thickness. The location of this
peak corresponds to an aluminum content of 49%, 3% higher than was intended.
From this we can infer that the core layers are at 33% and 43%.
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Figure 2.9: An SEM cross-section of one of the devices, showing the measured
dimensions of each feature. The core layers and GaAs substrate are visible below
the surface. The halo is due to the non-conducting properties of the uncoated
material and the dirt on the device can safely be ignored.
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2.4 Tests of birefringence, loss, and nonlinearity
2.4.1 Birefringence measurements and further modeling
The first experiment required to validate the operation of the device is a mea-
surement of its birefringence. There are a number of ways to measure birefringence.
One involves measuring the Fabry-Perot fringes of the waveguide with reflective
facets at both polarizations, measuring the difference in fringe spacing between the
two to determine the birefringence [62]. However, because the devices are at most
8 mm long, the fringe spacing is beyond the resolution of most optical spectrum
analyzers. Alternatively, one can use a setup similar to a Lyot filter, where the
device under test is placed between two crossed polarizers oriented 45o with respect
to the birefringent axes of the device and pumped with a broadband light source. In
this configuration, the birefringent waveguide rotates the 45o polarized light by an
amount that depends on the wavelength, allowing more or less light to pass through
an analyzer oriented at −45o. The result is a series of spectral fringes whose spacing
depends on the birefringence of the device. If the analyzer is rotated by 90o, the
fringes invert, allowing us to accurately determine the spacing using the crossing
points of the two spectra. There is one problem with this method; for such a small
birefringence, we only expect to see part of one fringe, making it very difficult to
measure the fringe spacing. In order to compensate, we insert a birefringent potas-
sium diphosphide, or KDP, crystal with the same orientation as the waveguide. By
measuring the crystal’s birefringence independently first, we can then add the waveg-
uide and measure the change. Because the two axes are aligned, the birefringence
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is purely additive, and the magnitude of the change in fringe spacing corresponds
directly to the birefringence. To understand how this occurs, consider the intensity
as a function of the wavelength, determined from the product of the Jones matrices








































where δn0 and L0 are the birefringence and length of the KDP crystal, δn and
L are the birefringence and length of the waveguide, and k is the wavenumber
corresponding to the wavelength λ. The resulting spectrum should show fringes that
are spaced linearly in the wavenumber, whose period is a sum of the birefringence
of the crystal and the waveguide. If we measure the birefringence of the crystal
independently, we can subtract it out to determine the birefringence only due to the
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where ∆k0 is the fringe spacing without the waveguide and ∆k is the fringe spacing
with waveguide added.
A sample scan of one device is shown in Figure 2.11. Also shown is a scan of
the KDP alone. Determining the birefringence from these data is nontrivial. First,
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one must replot the data in terms of wavenumber, then read off the position of each
point where the crossed- and co-polarized spectra coincide. This gives an accurate
determination of the position of each fringe. Plotting that position as a function
of fringe number gives a nominally straight line whose slope is equal to the fringe
spacing. We can then plot the lines of the various devices, measuring the difference
in slope between the the line for the device and the line for the KDP only. The
birefringence measurement of the KDP alone agreed to within 10% of the published
value in [44]. This is a good validation of the measurement technique. The plots
for the various devices under test are shown in Figure 2.12, along with a plot of the
determined birefringence of each device. Note that all of the devices 3 µm and wider
appear to be multimode, and the measured birefringence matches reasonably well
with simulations of higher order modes. The fact that the devices are multimode
was confirmed with microscope images of the output facets taken while the devices
were illuminated. However, the 2.5 µm device appears to be single mode and has
a birefringence of 4.4 × 10−4, well within the target range of the design. Thus this
device appears to be a good candidate with which to proceed.
In order to determine precisely where this device should be phase matched
and how well we can control the birefringence, we ran more accurate models of the
2.5 µm device. Instead of using the previous commercial modesolving software, we
employed the MATLAB waveguide modesolver of Professor Tom Murphy[18]. In
addition to being open source, this code provides scripting ability, enabling us to
automate its execution for a series of wavelegnths to generate full dispersion curves.
We can also incorporate the temperature-dependent Sellmeier equations discussed
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above into the model to obtain a more accurate description of the material. We
implemented this code, compiled into an executable, and ran it on a Dell PowerEdge
workstation with 12 GB of RAM in order to determine the full dispersion curves
shown in Figure 2.15. We modeled two separate devices: The first, as we originally
designed it, with the target aluminum contents and feature sizes. The second model
was run using the measured aluminum content and feature size from the final 2.5 µm
device. As the data shows, the change in aluminum content results in a significant
shift in the overall index of the device. However, taking the difference of the two
curves shows that the birefringence of the device is not significantly different. In
fact, if we extrapolate the red curve to the wavelength where the birefringence
measurement was made, we see that it matches to within 10%. This indicates that
the modeling is a very accurate way to predict device birefringence and shows that
one can design a waveguide to a specific birefringence without uncertainties due to
growth effects such as strain. This is a very promising result for future work on
similar devices and for the modeling capabilities as well.
We can further use these dispersion curves to calculate the phase-matched
detuning that we expect. The results of this calculation are shown in Figure 2.16.
The two curves correspond to the device as designed and as fabricated and show only
a shift of less than 0.5 nm in the phase matched wavelength. This is also a promising
result, as it shows that the phase matching wavelength is not terribly sensitive to
fabrication tolerances. Judging from this data, we expect to see correlated pairs
detuned between 9 and 9.5 nm from the pump wavelength with a bandwidth of 0.4
nm.
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Figure 2.10: The setup used to measure birefringence. The birefringence of the
device is determined by observing the change in the fringe spacing between scans
with only the KDP crystal and with both the crystal and the waveguide.
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Figure 2.11: A sample of the spectrum of a 3 µm device, showing the fringes with
the output analyzer both cross- and co-polarized to the input polarizer.
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Figure 2.12: Plots of the fringe spacing for a series of devices. Verifying that these
results are statistically significant, the slope of the line for the KDP only was mea-
sured to be 154.3 ± 1.2, while the 2.5µm device has a slope of 151.38 ± 0.67, or
approximately six standard deviations lower.
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Figure 2.13: The final results of the birefringence measurement, showing that most of
the devices are actually multimode with an order of magnitude greater birefringence
than the design goal. The 2.5 µm device, however, exhibited a birefringence in the
design target range.
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Figure 2.14: Microscope images of the mode outputs of various devices, showing
that the devices wider than 2.5 µm are indeed multimode.
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Figure 2.15: A more in-depth look at the modeling of the 2.5 µm device using Pro-
fessor Tom Murphy’s MATLAB modesolver [18] with material dispersion modeling
included (see Appendix A). While the variation in aluminum content during growth
shifted the dispersion curve, the actual birefringence seemed to be unaffected
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Figure 2.16: A plot of the predicted phase-matching peaks for both the device as
designed and as fabricated. We expect to see 4WM phase matched at between 9
and 9.5 nm detuned from the pump, with little effect from fabrication tolerances.
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2.4.2 The PPLN pump source
In order to probe the nonlinear properties of this device, we need a high
power pump source at 780 nm. While a number of choices exist, we chose a bulk,
periodically poled lithium niobate crystal to frequency double a 1560 nm fiber laser7.
This offers some practical advantages over a titanium sapphire laser mainly in cost
and compactness. We obtained a 35 mm long MgO:PPLN bulk crystal with 5 poling
periods ranging from 18.0 to 19.0 µm. We chose 19 µm as the poling period primarily
because it is the largest and most easily identified track on the crystal. To achieve
phase matching at 780 nm and to avoid photorefractive damage of the crystal, we
determined using the SNLO software[60] that the crystal must be heated to 176o C.
The first version of the PPLN pump source is shown in Figure 2.17. Data showing
measurements of the output are shown in Figure 2.18. The data shows that, when
pumped at the optimal wavelength of 1557.03 nm, it is possible to achieve almost
20% conversion efficiency. We further verified that the acceptance bandwidth of the
PPLN is 0.345 nm, closely matching our prediction for a 35 mm crystal.
7The details of quasi-phase-matched second harmonic generation in PPLN are well known and
need not be reproduced here. For details, see [31] or [13]
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Figure 2.17: A schematic of the first version of the PPLN pump source.
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Figure 2.18: A scan of the SHG power vs. the input wavelength, showing secondary
phase matching peaks characteristic of nonlinear processes. The peak output power
of the PPLN is in the tens of watts, approaching the theoretical limit of approxi-
mately 20% conversion efficiency. The measured bandwidth matches to within 1.5%
of the calculated bandwidth for a 35 mm long crystal.
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2.4.3 Detector calibration procedure
The detector in each measurement, whether a low-noise PIN diode, an ampli-
fied APD, or a PMT, was calibrated using the following procedure. Pump light was
launched into the device and maximum coupling was achieved. The monochromator
was set to the center wavelength of the pump, where nominally the detector and
lock-in amplifier were saturated. Four stages of neutral density filters were added
to achieve up to 60 dB of attenuation, until the lock-in was no longer saturated.
This signal voltage was then compared to a power measurement made directly after
the output coupling objective by a calibrated power meter. Comparing the average
power (and the calculated peak power using the duty cycle) to the lock-in voltage
reading resulted in a calibration curve used to estimate the photon number detected
at each wavelength.
2.4.4 Preliminary four wave mixing measurements
Using this high power pump source, we were able to make initial measurements
of spontaneous sideband generation. This involved launching the pump beam using
free-space optics, as shown in the schematic in Figure 2.19. One of the key com-
ponents of the coupling system is the free-space coupling stage. Based on a design
courtesy of Dr. Richard Mirin at NIST in Boulder, CO, and of staff members at
JILA, this configuration allows a free-space beam to be coupled to the device via
a moveable objective lens; each mirror is translated along the beam axis indepen-
dently, letting the input beam alignment to stay fixed to the rest of the setup while
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still allowing the objective lens to translate.
Using this setup, we were able to take the spectral scan shown in Figure 2.20.
This scan indicates spontaneous sideband generation 8.5 nm detuned from the pump,
within about 10% of the expected detuning. However, before we could perform any
further tests to validate these results, we caused irreparable damage to the input
facet of the device due to too much input average power. Microscope images of this
damage are shown in Figure 2.21.
It was initially uncertain whether the damage was being caused by thermal
heating of the device, an effect that is sensitive to average power, or by extremely
high field strengths due to high peak power. Further tests later confirmed that the
damage was indeed due to thermal effects resulting from excessive average pump
power.
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Figure 2.19: A schematic of the setup used to look for spontaneous 4WM. The free-
space coupling stage is not shown, but allows for a free-space beam to stay aligned
to the source while the coupling objective is moved to align to the waveguide.
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Figure 2.20: A preliminary scan of the waveguide output, showing spontaneous
sideband generation at 8.5 nm detuned from the pump. Before we could further
investigate these peaks, the input coupling face of the waveguide was destroyed by
the high-power pump pulses.
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Figure 2.21: Microscope images of the damaged device. High average power caused
thermal heating in the chip, resulting in damage to both the input facet and the
rib.
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2.4.5 Modified source and subsequent four wave mixing measure-
ments
In order to avoid damaging the device, we were forced to modify the pump
source in order to achieve nominally the same peak pulse power while reducing the
overall average power. One attempt to do this involved using a mode-locked laser
in place of the CW tunable laser and modulator to reduce the duty cycle by an or-
der of magnitude. While this did manage to decrease the average power and avoid
damaging the chip, it did have two undesirable side effects. First, the mode-locked
laser produced 200 fs pulses, resulting in a bandwidth that was significantly wider
than the 0.345 nm acceptance bandwidth of the PPLN. This caused a significant
loss in conversion efficiency but, more importantly, resulted in an extremely noisy
pump signal. A plot of the output spectrum of the pump is shown in Figure 2.22.
Even after using a grating to filter the output, there was still significant noise on
the single-photon level where our detector is sensitive. The mode locked laser was
also significantly more unstable than the pulse-carved CW source, At low conver-
sion efficiency, the PPLN output is sensitive to the square of the input power (the
efficiency is dependent on the pump power itself), so the SHG process magnified the
instabilities in the mode-locked laser, resulting in a source that was not stable even
long enough to make a single spectral scan.
The final configuration of the source involved returning the the CW pulse-
carved scheme, but driven with an external oscillator at a lower duty cycle, as
shown in Figure 2.23. Because the duty cycle was significantly lower, we required
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a more sensitive detection system. After trying a fast, amplfied APD from Menlo
Systems that allowed us to lock in at the fast pulse frequency rather than the slow
chopper frequency, we settled on a photo-multiplier tube that is sensitive down to
the single-photon level. Because the detector still had a bandwidth of 12 kHz, it still
required that we chop the beam at low frequency. However, this was compensated
by the high sensitivity of the detector; upon calibrating the detector, we found it
to be sensitive on the single photon level with integration times on the order of 100
ms, as shown in Figure 2.24.
The spectral scans shown in Figure 2.27 depict data acquired with this mod-
ified pump source and a second 2.5 µm device. They show that there are features
of interest at exactly 9.5 nm detuned from the pump, the shift predicted by the
simulation data. While there are other spectral features of unknown origin, the plot
in Figure 2.27 shows that only the features detuned 9.5 nm from the pump exhibit
nonlinear power dependence. Furthermore, the features exhibit the expected polar-
ization behavior - namely when a scan is taken with an extra polarizer oriented at
the pump polarization, the features are less prominent. When the extra polarizer is
rotated by 90o, the features become stronger in power.
One feature to note in the nonlinear spectral scan data is that the red-shifted
peak appears to be weaker than the blue-shifted peak. One possible explanation for
this is the wavelength dependence of the 2PA coefficient (discussed in more detail
in a later section). Because of the thermal distribution of the density of states in
the conduction band, the 2PA coefficient actually peaks when the photon energy is
equal to approximately 60% of the gap energy [56] (the 2PA coefficient is necessarily
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zero when the photon energy is less than half of the gap energy). Because we are
pumping the device at roughly 80% of the gap energy of the core material, we expect
that the 2PA coefficient should be smaller when detuned blue from the pump and
larger when detuned red from the pump. This is consistent with our observations
in Figure 2.27.
2.4.6 Expected 4WM efficiency and corresponding observations
Using the nonlinear index from [33], we are able to make a zeroth order pre-
diction regarding the efficiency of the nonlinear process. Figure 2.31 shows a plot
of the expected parametric gain versus the input power for a 2.5 µm, 8 mm long
device. This prediction is based on the co-polarized value of the nonlinear suscep-
tibility tensor. We can use this plot to calculate the expected pair generation rate
using the following expression [70]:
dN
dt
= η |γP0L|2 ∆ντR (2.55)
where η is the detection efficiency, ∆ν is the phase-matched bandwidth, τ is the pulse
duration, and R is the pulse repetition rate. The calibration procedure accounts for
the detector efficiency, so we can safely ignore the factor of η. We can then divide
by R to obtain the predicted number of photons generated per pulse:
ρ = |γP0L|2 ∆ντ (2.56)
Figure 2.28 shows a calibrated scan with what seems to be spontaneously generated
sidebands with 400 mW of input pump power. At this pump power, we expect from
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Figure 2.31 that the parametric gain is greater than 0.1. Since the pulse bandwidth is
approximately one tenth of the phase-matched bandwidth of the device, the product
∆ντ is approximately 10. Hence we would expect to see on the order of ρ = 1
photon/pulse in the spontaneous sidebands. However, we observe less than 0.1,
indicating that the observed gain is reduced by an order of magnitude. Since the










0.1 ≈ 0.3. This poses a significant problem, as it implies that
the power required for efficient correlated photon generation could be too great for
practical operation. It is, however, consistent with observations for other zincblende
semiconductors, as outlined in [21].
2.4.7 Linear and nonlinear loss measurements
For the sake of thoroughness, it is important that we characterize both the
linear and nonlinear loss of the device. Because we are operating at greater than
half of the bandgap energy, we expect to see significant two-photon absorption. In
addition, the correlation of the generated photon pairs is very sensitive to linear loss
in the device, so it is important to verify that the linear loss is relatively low.
In order to estimate the linear loss, we chose to perform a simple yet rather
crude experiment. We pumped the device with rather high power and measured the
change in the out-of-plane scattered light levels using digitized microscope images.
A sample of the data is shown in Figure 2.29. By measuring the rate of decay, and
assuming the impurities from which the light is scattered are uniformly distributed,
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we estimate the device to have a linear loss of between 3 and 6 dB/cm. The overall
insertion loss, including coupling efficiency, was measured to be 13 dB.
In order to measure nonlinear loss, we performed another simple experiment
where we measured the output power versus the input power. The plot in Figure 2.30
shows that the transmission is dependent on the input power, indicating measurable
nonlinear absorption. We can use these data to calculate the 2PA coefficient in the
following way: Consider the differential equation governing the intensity of the pump






where the first term represents the linear loss and the second term represents the
intensity-dependent nonlinear loss resulting from 2PA given a gaussian pulse. Di-









If we define an effective length as Leff =
eαL
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, where limα→0 Leff = L, then we can







Assuming an effective mode area of 2.5 µm2, we can replot the data in Figure 2.30
in terms of the inverse of the transmission versus the input intensity. This gives us
a line, as shown in Figure 2.30, where the y-intercept represents the exponential of
the linear loss times the device length and the slope represents the nonlinear loss
times the effective length. Since we do not have an accurate determination of the
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effective length of the device, we can only estimate the range of values of the 2PA
coefficient. Given the results of both loss experiments, we can estimate that the
2PA coefficient of the device is between 3 and 25 cm/GW. This range of values is
of the same order as measured for similar materials [67].
Figure 2.22: A plot of the output spectrum of the PPLN before and after a grat-
ing. The broadband nature of the mode-locked laser caused significant light to be
generated even outside the quasi-phasematched bandwidth. Even after the grating,
significant structure was observed at the single-photon level.
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Figure 2.23: A schematic of the final waveguide pump source. The seed is still a CW
tunable laser with an external Mach-Zender modulator. The duty cycle is reduced
to 0.8% using an external oscillator.
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Figure 2.24: A spectral scan of the waveguide output showing features at 9.5 nm
detuning. Note the near-single-photon sensitivity.
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Figure 2.25: Spectral scans of the pump light without the waveguide and of the
waveguide output overlaid. Most of the structure is on the pump beam itself, but
note that there are significant differences in the spectra around 9.5 nm detuned from
the center.
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Figure 2.26: Two spectral scans taken with an extra sheet polarizer on the output,
showing the proper behavior for birefringent phase matching. The sidebands are
more visible when the sheet polarizer is aligned to the fast axis of the device, while
the pump remains polarized on the slow axis. Note that the pump beam is so
broadened that its wings overlap with the expected sidebands.
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Figure 2.27: A plot of data indicating phase-matched nonlinearity at the expected
detuning. Two scans were taken, one at high pump power and one at lower pump
power (reduced by one third via a wire mesh placed before the input facet). The
ratio between the two shows nonlinear power dependence at 9.5 nm detuned from
the pump beam
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Figure 2.28: A spectral scan taken at higher pump power. There are still features
at 9.5 nm detuning but their strengths are much smaller than expected. Using
the published value for n2 and the fact that the pulse bandwidth is one tenth of
the phase-matched bandwidth, we would expect to observe approximately 1 pho-
ton/pulse on average. The plot shows an order of magnitude less.
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Figure 2.29: To estmate the linear loss, we fit an approximate exponential curve
(left) to a digitized image of the out-of-plane scattering from the waveguide (right).
While crude, this technique is minimally invasive and provides some indication of
the order of magnitude of the device loss.
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Figure 2.30: Plots of output power vs. input power, showing appreciable 2PA. By
replotting the data in terms of the inverse of the transmission, we can estimate the
2PA coefficient.
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2.4.8 Practical implications of observed inefficiency
As stated above, the observed nonlinear gain appears to be an order of mag-
nitude smaller than expected. While the origin of the inefficiency is unknown, we
can estimate its implications. For example, consider the figure of merit outlined
above. If we assume for the moment the best case scenario, where the nonlinear
index is equal to the expected value of 3 × 10−17 m2/W (rather than 70% less,
as was observed), and make a reasonable assumption that the 2PA coefficient is
β = 20 cm/GW, the figure of merit defined above comes out to be 1.1, only slightly
greater than unity. If the 4WM gain is less than expected, especially by an order of
magnitude, then the figure of merit will be reduced significantly below 1 and 2PA
will dominate.
In addition, the reduced 4WM gain indicates that pumping the device hard
enough to generate appreciable pairs will require operating the device in the regime
where damage previously occurred. Previously, damage was observed when the duty
cycle was 1% and the peak power was around 10 W at 780 nm. Assuming the gain is
an order of magnitude lower, one would need approximately three times the pump
power to achieve the pair generation rate initially expected. Even assuming one
shortens the pulse length by 90% to match (but not exceed) the acceptance band-
width of the device, the duty cycle constraints would limit the pulse repetition rate
to less than 300 MHz. While this is not necessarily slow, it offers no improvement
over any of the other pair generation schemes and does not approach the GHz rate
that broadband QKD applications demand.
85
2.4.9 Pump probe measurements and thermal effects
A conclusive test to measure the parametric gain of the nonlinear interaction
would be to introduce a probe beam at the signal wavelength, cross-polarized to
and simultaneous with the pump beam. This would allow one to determine the
gain, given the power of both the pump and the probe. We implemented such an
experiment using a CW DFB laser at 770 nm that was tunable via temperature
control of the diode. This experiment yielded inconclusive results pertaining to
4WM, but did indicate that there are thermal effects that may be interfering with
the nonlinear process of interest.
The data in Figure 2.32 shows both the magnitude and phase of the lock-
in signal used to create the spectral scan. As is evident from the phase data in
the spectral region of the probe beam, the probe is demodulated by the pump.
That is, the presence of a burst of pulses from the pump causes a decrease in the
strength of the probe beam. The cause of this is unknown, but there are at least
two possibilities. First, it may be a slow, thermal effect, where heating in the
waveguide due to the strong pump causes the guiding properties of the waveguide
to change and the subsequent leakage of the mode carrying the CW probe signal.
Alternatively, it could be a result of two photon absorption between the pump and
probe. There is some indication that the cause is the former; a decrease in the
strength of this interaction was noted when using the fast APD with an RF lock-
in amplifier oscillating at the PRF of 20 MHz when compared to the scans with
the slower detector and the 200 Hz mechanical chopper. Hence it seems that there
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is some unknown thermal effect causing a change in the guiding properties of the
waveguide in the presence of strong pump pulses. This is disconcerting, as it could
easily imply that the phase-matching condition or even the nonlinearity itself is
modified in the presence of a strong pump beam.
Figure 2.31: A plot of the expected parametric gain using published values of n2.
The actual gain curve depends on the other nonlinear susceptibility tensor element,
the relative strength of which is unknown. The arrows indicate the expected gain
if the cross-polarized susceptibility were as strong as the co-polarized one. Since
the observed gain was barely above the detection threshold of 0.01 photons/mode,
we can conclude that the cross-polarized susceptibility tensor element is reduced by
70% of the expected value.
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Figure 2.32: A spectral scan of the pump probe, showing both the magnitude and
phase of the lock-in signal. The 180o phase-shift at the lock-in detected signal
indicates that the pump is causing the signal to decrease rather than increase. The
origin of this effect requires further investigation.
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2.5 Results and further work
2.5.1 Current results and open questions
The goal of this project is ultimately to demonstrate the feasibility of using
four-wave mixing in a birefringent waveguide as a source of entanglement for appli-
cations such as QKD. In order to do so, a number of questions must be answered.
First and foremost, it must be demonstrated that one can fabricate a waveguide
with a controllable and predictable birefringence. We have shown the ability to
accurately predict the waveguide birefringence, and we have demonstrated that one
can fabricate a waveguide with a specific birefringence, even in the presence of un-
certainties due to strain during material growth. We have fabricated the first set of
devices and used them to measure such basic waveguide properties such as insertion
loss, device loss, and nonlinear loss. We have also devised a straightforward way to
accurately measure small birefringence. Finally, we have shown that there is indeed
birefringent phase matched nonlinearity occurring at the detuning predicted by the
model. However, we have shown that the strength of the cross-polarized nonlinear
interaction is significantly weaker than we had originally expected, requiring poten-
tially unreasonable pump power levels for efficient correlated photon generation.
These preliminary results beg some very fundamental questions. First, it is
still unclear what role the group velocity dispersion plays in the phase matching.
We know that the GVD plays a key role in the birefringent phase matching and
that is is dominated by the material dispersion in devices whose feature size is
larger than the wavelength[65]. However, we have no clear measurement of the
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GVD of the device, forcing us to make an educated guess at the phase matched
wavelength. Our measurements only predict the average birefringence of the device
over a small spectral range. For a more thorough characterization of the ability to
control phase matching, it is important to come up with a way to measure the GVD.
One possibility is to use a phase shift technique similar to that used in Costa, et
al., outlined in [15]. In this setup, a vector voltmeter is used to measure the phase
shift of slowly-modulated, broadband optical signal at different wavelengths. The
only uncertainty in the application of this technique is whether the device is long
enough to introduce a phase shift larger than the vector voltmeter’s phase precision.
However, the technique is simple enough that it warrents further investigation and
is compatible with the same setup used to measure the birefringence of the device.
Another issue related to the birefringence is a lack of understanding of the
uniformity of the birefringence of the waveguide. While the measurement described
above measured the overall birefringence, there was no information about the varia-
tion in the birefringence over the length of the device. Local strain or defects in the
material may contribute to a variation in the birefringence that may be masked in
the measurement but result in very poor phase matching for the nonlinear process.
Currently we cannot determine the uniformity of the birefringence along the length
of the device. One possible way to measure this would be to employ a technique
similar to one used to measure the linear loss. That is, we can fabricate a chip
with devices of the same dimensions as the one currently used, but with a series of
different lengths, as shown in Figure 2.33. A chip with this layout would be useful
for both measuring the uniformity of the birefringence and for directly measuring
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the linear loss.
Figure 2.33: A concept of a chip with devices of various lengths. Because the U
bends contribute constant loss, this chip is useful in measuring the linear loss of the
device more precisely. In addition, by measuring the birefringence of the various
length devices, we can glean some idea of the uniformity of the birefringence over
the length of the device.
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2.5.2 Further nonlinearity and correlation measurements
The next task is to quantify the strength of the nonlinear interaction. While
the current pump setup is rather limited, with some modification we can create
a pump-probe setup that can directly probe the strength and time dependence of
the parametric gain and nonlinear loss. We propose using a second PPLN crystal
phase-matched at a wavelength 9.5 nm shifted from the current pump, as shown in
Figure 2.34. We can use a broadband pulsed 1550 nm source and split it into two
parallel amplification paths - one at the pump frequency and one at the new, shifted
frequency. If we rotate the SHG output of one crystal and launch them along the
same beam path with a controllable delay, we can create two simultaneous, orthog-
onally polarized pulses of different strengths that we can use in a true pump-probe
experiment. Because they have a controllable delay between them, it is feasible to
use this source to probe the exact mechanism of the thermal decoupling as well.
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Figure 2.34: A schematic of the proposed source for a more detailed pump probe
setup. Both the pump and probe beams are generated from the same broadband
source, creating synchronized pulses that can be adjusted in time, wavelength, and
power, allowing for maximum flexibility in measuring the nonlinearity.
93
Once we have thoroughly quantified the parametric gain, we can perform cor-
relation measurements using a simple coincidence counting technique. The simplest
approach would be to separate the signal and idler photons with only a long pass
filter at 45o incidence, reflecting one half of the pair to one SPAD and transmitting
the other half to a second SPAD. If better filtering and precision are required, a grat-
ing can be used to separate the wavelengths. This presents a greater experimental
challenge.
2.5.3 From correlation to entanglement
The final question that remains in this project is the exact method to create
entangled photon pairs from the copolarized, correlated pairs that result from the
four wave mixing process in the device. A number of possibilities exist, including
using a two-photon interferometer or doing a double pass in opposite directions,
using two counterpropagating pump beams to create two pairs in different direc-
tions. These possibilities are shown in Figure 2.35 and certainly warrant further
investigation.
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Figure 2.35: One concept for possibly generating polarization entanglement from
this device. Note that a source of conjugate pump beams is required.
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Another more straightforward way to glean entanglement from the 4WM pro-
cess is simply to use the generated photons as a frequency entangled pair for a single
sideband encoded QKD system. In this QKD implementation, described in [41], the
qubit is encoded in the frequency of photon rather than the polarization. The basis
choices are then made using Mach-Zender interferometers and acousto-optic modula-
tors rather than polarization optics. This implementation is much more compatible
with optical fiber channels than polarization, as the frequency stability of the fiber is
orders of magnitude better than the polarization stability. In addition, unlike phase
encoding approaches, this encoding scheme does not require that one balance two
interferometers on either side of the link, an experimentally challenging task. Hence
this technique holds a lot of promise for fiber-based QKD, and the 4WM source
directly provides a source of frequency entanglement for such an encoding scheme.
2.6 Conclusions
This project is only a first step toward a more thorough effort to develop an
entanglement source based on birefringent four wave mixing in a waveguide. How-
ever, it has laid the foundations for further efforts by providing a starting design
and fundamental set of data about the device operation. The current set of prelimi-
nary results suggest the strength of the nonlinear interaction is significantly smaller
than expected, but there are still a number of fundamental questions that remain.
However, we have created a framework and test setup for testing other devices and
materials. Should such further experiments succeed, they have the potential to
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create a compact, convenient, fast source of entanglement for QKD and beyond.
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Chapter 3
Detector Dead-Time Effects and Paralyzability in Broadband QKD
”I don’t want to achieve immortality through my work; I want to achieve immortal-
ity through not dying.” -Woody Allen
3.1 Problems encountered in the high-speed regime
We previously discussed (and will expound upon in Chapter 4) the speed
limitation resulting from the detector’s timing jitter. However, there are other
properties of real single-photon detectors that become significant when transmitting
quantum channel bits at high speeds. One of the most important parameters is
recovery time. Silicon SPADs have a finite recovery time, τ , that is typically of the
order of 100 ns. This interval, known as the dead time, is initiated when a detection
event triggers an avalanche in the SPAD, after which the detector is unresponsive.
The amplified avalanche current must be quenched and free charge carriers must
be removed from the SPAD before it can be reset to its active state. This process
limits the maximum count rate of such devices to less than τ−1. It is worthwhile
to note other types of detectors, such as superconducting single-photon detectors
can support significantly higher count rates, but they still exhibit finite reset times
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due to kinetic inductance. For most QKD systems, dead-time effects are reasonably
assumed to have a negligible impact on overall performance; typical transmission
rates, ρTX , and link losses, L, are such that most systems operate in a regime where
the detection rate is low with respect to the maximum count rate, i.e. ρRX  τ−1.
However, in broadband QKD links that transmit with GHz clock rates, effects due to
transmitting significantly faster than the dead time become critical to both efficient
operation and fundamental security [51].
The most common detector configuration for QKD in the BB84 protocol [6]
is one in which the receiver, Bob, has a separate single-photon detector for each
bit value in each basis. We restrict our discussion to this configuration and further
assume that the detectors are free-running SPADs whose low noise allows them to
be used without active gating. This is often the case in free-space QKD systems
and fiber QKD systems with up-conversion detectors [75].
In this configuration, when the quantum-channel transmission rate satisfies
ρTX > τ
−1 photons can arrive and be detected at the receiver at a time when one or
more of the SPADs is recovering from a prior detection event. If two such detection
events occur in the same basis they necessarily correspond to opposite bit values in
the key and are completely correlated [74]. This is an obvious security violation;
Eve, having full access to the measurement basis, only needs to guess which detector
started the alternating sequence in each basis. Thus any key sequence that is sifted
while one detector in a basis is dead only contains, at most, one bit of secure
information.
To better illustrate this effect, let us examine correlations that occur in the
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sifted key as the transmission rate is increased. From a simple Monte-Carlo simu-
lation of standard, ideal BB84 QKD, we can measure a parameter of the sifted key
called the transition probability, or the probability that, given a bit valued 1, the






[(bit [i] + bit [i]) mod2] (3.1)
where bit [i] is the ith bit in the sifted key sequence, N is the number of bits in the
sifted key and the addition is performed modulo 2. Figure 3.1 shows the value of
Ptrans as the the transmission rate is increased beyond τ
−1.
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Figure 3.1: Monte-Carlo results showing the transition probability in a 1MB sifted
key versus the normalized transmission rate for various link losses
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Note that we introduce the normalized transmission rate, k = τρTX , which is
unitless and more convenient for our calculations. Also, note that, for the regime
where ρTX < τ
−1, Ptrans remains constant at the expected value of 50%. As the
clock rate is increased past the dead time (k > 1), Ptrans quickly deviates from
the deesired value of 50% for a random key, asymptotically approaching 62.2%.
This value is unique to BB84 QKD with four detectors and can be understood
from the following calculation [74]. At high photon-arrival rates, detection events
tend to occur in fixed sequences; the detectors recover and then fire again in order.
Without loss of generality, we arbitrarily choose one detector to produce the first
sifted bit. After this event there are six possible detection sequences, which are
listed in Table 3.1. Consider as an example the detection sequence 1-3-4-2, with
detectors 1 and 3 representing bit value ’1’ in their respective bases and detectors
2 and 4 representing ’0’ in their respective bases. For this ordering, the probability,
P3, that the next detection event on detector 3 will produce the next sifted bit is
P3 = (1/2)
1. Similarly, P4 = (1/2)2, P2 = (1/2)
3, P1 = (1/2)
4 and so on, are the
probabilities that detectors 4, 2 and 1, respectively will produce the next sifted bit
after detector 1 produces the first sifted bit (i.e. all detection events in between
are not included in the sifted key). Given the sifted-bit value of ’1’ from the first
detection event and the subsequent infinite sequence of the 1-3-4-2 firing order, we



















Repeating this calculation for all six possible detection sequences gives us the in-
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dividual transition probabilities for each of the six detection sequences, shown in
Table 3.1. Since each sequence is equally likely to occur within a long sifted key, we
























Table 3.1: Individual transition probabilities for each detection sequence. Boldface
indicates a detection event that corresponds to a ‘0’ bit value.

































































































3.2 Secure high-speed QKD
The security implications of transmitting faster than the inverse of the detector
dead time go well beyond issues with key correlations. Since Eve has access to the
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classical channel, she knows when bits are detected and in which basis they are
sifted. As discussed above, when sequences of two or more detection events occur in
a single basis with spacing less than the dead time, the detectors within a single basis
fire alternately. This phenomenon provides Eve with nearly all of the information
about the sifted bit string except for one bit representing which detector fired first
within a given basis. Therefore, such detection sequences, regardless of their length,
can produce at most a single sifted bit. In other words, production of a sifted bit
from a detection sequence of any length requires that the detection sequence begins
when both detectors in a given basis are active. This requirement is necessary for
the secure operation of a QKD system at transmission rates ρTX > τ
−1 and must
be imposed on the receiver either by some means of gating the detectors or by the
sifting algorithm.
It is apparent that this security requirement has an effect on the sifted key
generation rate. In the low count rate regime, the sifted bit rate increases with
increasing transmission rate. However, as the count rate increases beyond the inverse
detector dead time, longer and longer detection sequences occur during which only
one detector is live. Each of these sequences can only produce one bit of sifted key,
resulting in a diminishing return on subsequent increases in the transmission rate.
This effect eventually outweighs any benefit of increased transmission rate, resulting
in a decrease of the sifted bit rate. Thus there should exist an optimum transmission
rate for obtaining the most sifted key from the system.
To compute where this optimum occurs, we start by calculating the probability
that both detectors in a given basis are active when a photon is detected using the
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state space model shown in Figure 3.2. In this two-dimensional model, the state
of one of the receiver’s bases, in this case the HV basis, is quantified by how many
clock periods need to pass before each detector in the basis is active, e.g. the state
(3, 7) would denote that the H detector is three clock cycles away from being alive
while the V detector is seven. Assuming that the two detectors have the same dead
time, the state space ranges from 0 to k, as shown. On each transmission period, or
clock cycle, a given detector either moves one period closer to recovery, or, if already
active, the detector remains so or undergoes a detection event and moves k periods
away from recovery. The probability that both detectors are active is given by the
probability P0,0 that the basis is in the state (0, 0).
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Figure 3.2: The state of Bob’s HV detection basis depicting a hypothetical detection
sequence and associated probabilities, as described in the text. The size of the space
is determined by the value of k, in this case chosen to be 8. Note that, although
they are depicted, the diagonal states are not accessible in the absence of noise,
since they can only result from the simultaneous detection of the same photon by
both detectors.
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To quantify the probability of having a detection event during a given clock
cycle, we find it useful to define a link loss parameter p = L/8, where L is the
probability that a transmission event at Alice is detected at Bob (the detectors are
assumed to be identical), commonly called the link loss. The factor of 8 accounts for
Bob’s basis choice (1/2), and Alice’s state choice (1/4). Therefore, ignoring noise,
p represents the probability that a particular detector produces a sifted bit on a
given clock cycle. It should be noted that this particular definition incorporates all
losses, including attenuation along the optical path, detector inefficiencies and even
empty pulses due to a mean photon number less than unity. This overarching loss
parameter then directly relates the transmission rate at Alice with the detection
rate at Bob. Note that this analysis is thus parameterized in the transmission
rate rather than the mean photon number. While the mean photon number is an
important design parameter, the transmission rate is in fact more relevant to the
analysis of dead-time effects. In fact, one can imagine a QKD system that transmits
at ρTX < τ
1 with link losses such that the photon arrival rate at Bob is equal to
that of another system operating at a transmission rate ρTX > τ
1 , but with higher
link losses. Only the latter of these two systems would exhibit the dead-time effects
addressed by this analysis.
Given this definition of p, the probability that a particular detector fires on
a given clock cycle is 2p. Using this value, we can calculate as an example the
likelihood of a hypothetical detection sequence, as depicted in Figure 3.2. The
sequence starts with a detection event on the ’V’ detector with probability 2p,
moving the basis from the origin to the state (0, k). For the next four clock cycles
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the ’H’ detector does not fire with probability (1−2p)4, followed by a detection event
on the ’H’ detector with probability 2p. The basis is now in the state (k, 3) and both
detectors are inactive. The state evolves with unity probability for three clock cycles
until the ’V’ detector recovers, and then returns to the origin as the ’V’ detector
does not fire for the next five clock cycles with likelihood (1− 2p)5. The probability
of this particular hypothetical detection sequence is therefore (2p)2(1− 2p)9.
In general, the goal of using the state space model is the determination of the
steady-state value of P(0,0), or the probability that both detectors will be alive at any
given time. Knowing this value will ultimately allow use to calculate the expected
sifted bit rate using this secure, high-speed BB84 scheme. To compute P(0,0), we
begin by writing down the recursive expression describing the probability that both
detectors are alive at the (n+ 1) clock cycle:
P
(n+1)
(0,0) = (1− 4p)P
(n)
(0,0) + (1− 2p)P
(n)
(0,1) + (1− 2p)P
(n)
(1,0) (3.4)
where the first term represents the probability of no detection events occurring and
the next two terms represent recovery from the (0, 1) and (1, 0) states, respectively.
We ignore recovery from the state (1, 1) because such diagonal states require simul-
taneous detection events that will not occur in the absence of noise. In steady state,
we drop the superscript and note that with random signals and identical detectors
the steady-state behaviors of the H and V detectors are the same, allowing us to








By the same argument one can write the probabilities P(0,k) = P(k,0) = Pk as
Pk = 2pP(0,0) + (2p)P1 (3.6)
which, with the substitution for P(0,0) from 3.5, reveals that Pk = P1. In fact,
similar calculations for P(1,0), P(2,0), etc., show that all 2k states lying upon the axes
have the same steady state probability P1. The states not lying on one of the axes
represent instances when both detectors are dead. Omitting the states along the
diagonal, the internal states are only accessible from on of the on-axis states. Since
the on-axis states are all of equal probability one can show that the internal states,
of which there are (k2 − k), are also of equal probability, in this case (2p)P1.
The expressions above represent the steady-state probabilities of the basis
being in each of the states in the entire state space. We normalize the sum of these
probabilities, giving
P(0,0) + (2k)P1 + (k
2 − k)(2p)P1 = 1 (3.7)
Substituting for P1 from 3.5, we can solve for P(0,0), the steady state probability
that both detectors are alive for a given transmission event, as a function of the link














As stated above, a detection sequence can only produce a sifted bit from events that
occur when both detectors are alive. Therefore, P(0,0)(p, k) should be used as an
additional factor in the calculation of a system’s sifted-bit rate. P(0,0)(p, k) is shown
in Figure 3.3 as a function of the normalized transmission rate k, for three values
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of the link loss L = 8p. It can be seen that as the transmission rate is increased
P(0,0)(p, k) begins to roll off, approaching zero as k
2 at high count rates. The roll-
off of P(0,0)(p, k) marks the onset of dead-time effects and the departure from the
low-count-rate regime.
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Figure 3.3: The likelihood P(0,0) that both detectors in a given basis are active when
a photon arrives versus the number of transmission periods per dead time, k, for
three values of the link loss L. The fact that P(0,0) tends to zero at high transmission
rates demonstrates the paralyzability of the QKD receiver.
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The behavior of P(0,0)(p, k) in the high-count-rate regime illuminates a charac-
teristic unique to operation of QKD systems at transmission rates ρTX > τ
1. From
the standpoint of producing sifted bits, when the pair of SPADs in a given basis is
considered as a whole, the QKD receiver becomes what is known as a paralyzable
counter [52] [2] [30]. Signals that arrive at a paralyzable counter during recovery,
though not counted, extend the necessary recovery time [30]. In contrast, non-
paralyzable counting systems recover from each counting event regardless of signals
that arrive during the dead time. Taken individually, SPADs are non-paralyzable
detectors; with the exception of counts that occur just as the detector comes alive
(referred to as ‘twilight counts’ in [71]), when the bias voltage is below the break-
down voltage, photons that arrive during the dead time have no significant effect
on the detector. It is worthwhile to note that the response of paralyzable and non-
paralyzable systems exhibit significant differences only in the regime of high count
rates [30], and paralyzability has become relevant to QKD systems as they continue
to increase in key-production rates.
Although each closely-spaced detection sequence can produce at most a single
sifted bit, it is also true that as the length of the detection sequence grows the
likelihood that a bit will be sifted from the sequence also grows. In the low-count-
rate regime the average length of a detection sequence is 1 and the likelihood of
sifting a bit from a sequence is 0.5. For a detection sequence of length 3, however,
the likelihood that at least one of the detection events occurred in the correct basis is
7/8. This fact offsets some of the deleterious dead-time effects and must be included
in the calculation of the sifted-bit rate.
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At any count rate, we can write the probability of sifting a bit from a detection











where TN(p, k) is the probability that the detection sequence consists of N detection
events. To calculate TN(p, k), we can use the state space model from Figure 3.2. For
a detection sequence of length 1 (i.e., a single detection event) there is only one path
through the state space. For longer sequences, we must sum the possible paths for
a given number of detection events. For example, there are a total of (k − 1) ways
to arrange two detection events before the basis returns to the (0,0) state; only one
of these ways is depicted in Figure 3.2. The probabilities of a detection sequence
having lengths up to N = 4 are



















The truncated geometric series in TN(p, k) can be evaluated with the standard tech-
niques to yield analytic expressions for all N . While the sum over N in 3.9 is
theoretically infinite, it is worthwhile to note that in practice, one needs to com-
pute TN(p, k) only up to N = 6, as the probability of sifting a bit from a detection
sequence longer than six events approaches unity. In addition, one interesting fea-
ture of TN(p, k) is the difference between even and odd values of N , as illustrated
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in Figure 3.4. While all N > 1 sequences have low probability in the low count-
rate regime, at high count rates the odd N sequences fall asymptotically to zero,
but the even N sequences have constant finite probabilities. This behavior can be
understood from the fact that an even N sequence minimizes the number of clock
cycles during which the detector is active but does not fire. For an odd N sequence,
the unlikely situation occurs where a live detector must not fire for at least k clock
cycles before the basis returns to the (0,0) state.
Noise sources such as background counts and detector dark counts can also be
included in the model in a straightforward manner. We define ε as the probability
that a detector experiences a noise event during one clock cycle. The probability
that a detector fires during a clock cycle, therefore changes from (2p) to (2p + ε),
which can be substituted into P(0,0)(p, k) and TN(p, k) accordingly. As mentioned
above, a noise event on one detector can occur on the same clock cycle as a signal (or
noise) event on the other detector. These simultaneous events put the basis in the
state (k, k), after which the basis recovers with unity probability along the diagonal
back to (0, 0). Thus, we find that when noise counts are included, the probability
that both detectors are alive on the (n + 1) clock cycle becomes
P
(n+1)
(0,0) = (1− 2(2p+ ε))P
(n)
(0,0) + 2(1− (2p+ ε))P
(n)




where the third term accounts for the simultaneous detection events. The steady
state calculation of P(0,0)(p, k) then proceeds in the same manner as described above.
It should be noted that while noise sources can cause simultaneous detection events,
no secure bits can be sifted from such occurrences.
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Figure 3.4: The probabilities TN(p, k) of a detection sequence having N detection
events versus the normalized transmission rate k, for link losses L = - 20 dB. There
is a characteristic difference in even and odd numbers of detection events in the
high-count rate regime.
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3.3 A Monte-Carlo simulation of QKD
In addition to the analytical model outlined above, we have also implemented
a Monte-Carlo simulation of BB84 QKD, both using the standard protocol (the
code used to examine the transition probability) and also a version incorporating
the modifications described above to maintain security in the high-speed regime.
The code for both implementations is listed in Appendix B.
The first version of the code, qkd trans prob.c, implements the traditional
BB84 protocol without considering the security implications of the detector dead
time. It operates in time units that are normalized to the detector’s dead time. It is
a Monte-Carlo simulation that uses the built-in ANSI C random number generator
seeded by the machine time. The code generates seven random variables it then uses
to choose the transmission basis, bit value, and detection basis. It also uses these
random variables to implement simulated link loss, detector inefficiency, and even
QBER (which was kept at 0 for these simulations). The code maintains flag variables
to determine which detectors are dead at what points throughout the key generation
process and uses an array of counters to keep track of the four detectors’ respective
dead times. Since it runs in ’unitless’ time, it is designed to continuously generate
sifted key bits until it has accumulated NBITS of key (set to NBITS=1048576 in
the version of the code in Appendix B). Once it accumulates this much sifted key,
it then analyzes the transition probability of the key, providing the data plotted in
Figure 3.1.
The second version of the code incorporates the modification to BB84 that is
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required to maintain security in the presence of long dead times. It does this by
defining a second flag variable that corresponds to the state of the opposite detector
in the given detection basis during a detection event. If one detector goes dead, all
events originating from its pair in the basis are not incorporated into the sifted key.
One major difference between this version of the code and the previous version is
that the new code, fc.c, operates in simulated ’real time.’ This means that there is
a fundamental clock unit of 100 ps around which everything else in the simulation
is designed. Thus the clock rate, dead times, etc., can all be defined in real time
units rather than in units of dead time. This is critical to properly simulating dead
time effects and accurately measuring the sifted bit rates that result.
Both versions of the code were run on the NIST RARITAN Linux-based com-
puting cluster. The cluster consists of over 400 nodes connected via ethernet. The
cluster is fully managed and includes all of the high-performance compilers and MPI
interfaces required to do parallel computing. However, instead of parallelizing the
code directly, it was simply run in a ’task farming’ way, where various parameters
were run on individual machines. As the code is not prohibitively intensive in com-
putation, this method was sufficient to obtain a full set of results within a few days
of computing time on a small number of machines.
3.4 The sifted bit rate in high-speed QKD
We have now described all of the necessary factors to incorporate dead time
effects into the sifted bit production rate. Returning to the noiseless picture, we
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write the sifted bit rate as
SBR = ρTX8pP(0,0)(p, k)S(p, k) (3.15)
The sifted-bit rate is shown in Figure 3.5 as a function of the transmission rate for
various detector dead times (a) and link losses (b). The lines indicate the results
from the analytic state-space model presented above. The symbols indicate results
from the BB84 Monte-Carlo simulation that incorporates the modified sifting algo-
rithm described above, sifting at most a single bit from sequences of closely-spaced
detection events. As illustrated in Figure 3.5, dead-time effects induce a maximum
value on the sifted-bit rate, above which further increases in transmission rate ac-
tually reduce the sifted-bit rate. The maximum value of the sifted-bit rate is a
complicated function of the link parameters. However, we find this maximum is not
strongly dependent on the link losses. As demonstrated in Figure 3.5(b), it may be





where the constant of proportionality was found by a least-squares fit. The factor
of (2τ)−1 represents the maximum sifted bit rate for the case of an actively gated
receiver in which all of the detectors are disabled when any of one of them fires [74].
Most significantly, the numerator is greater than 1, indicating that one can achieve
secure key production rates over 40% faster than previously thought.
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Figure 3.5: The sifted-bit rate including dead-time effects, showing excellent agree-
ment between the model (lines) and the simulation (symbols). The effect of varying
the dead time with fixed link loss is shown in (a). The effect of varying the link loss
with fixed dead time is shown in (b).
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The transmission rate at which the sifted-bit rate is maximized is also a com-
plicated function of the dead time and link losses. However, for typical link losses






For most QKD links the loss and dead time are such that detector timing resolution
plays a dominant role in determining the optimum transmission rate [9] [25][63][64].
However, as the disparity between the detector timing resolution and recovery time
grows with improved timing resolution, transmission-rate limitations imposed by
dead-time effects will become more significant.
3.5 Hardware approaches to addressing dead time effects
There are a variety of methods that may be employed to address the security
issue that arises in the ρTX > τ
1 regime. The algorithmic solution modeled above
is, to our knowledge, the most efficient with respect to the production of sifted
bits. The communications overhead associated with implementing are comparable
to traditional implementations of QKD, which can be anywhere from 17 to 100 times
the quantum channel data load. However, in the event that some implementation
would preclude the software scheme implementation proposed above, a hardware
solution would be required. An active hold-off scheme has been previously proposed,
in which all the detectors are disabled when any one of them fires [74]. Actively
disabling the detectors by some electronic means can be technically challenging,
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particularly as transmission rates exceed 1 GHz. As an alternative, we propose the
self-disabling receiver shown in Figure 3.6. In this system, the states in each of
Bob’s bases are sent to the same detector, though with different propagation delays
depending on the state. The states of the photons incident on each detector are
distinguished by their arrival times, much in the same manner that time-division-
multiplexed communications links distinguish various channels. Detection schemes
similar to this have also been implemented for basis discrimination in QKD links
[47]. The receiver proposed in Figure 3.6, however, would go further than basis
discrimination and shut down a basis entirely after a detection event. With only
one detector in each basis, the entire basis is disabled for the duration of the dead
time and sequences of closely-spaced detection events are eliminated. This QKD
receiver is a non-paralyzable counter capable of producing sifted bits at rates up to
τ−1s in the high-count-rate regime.
As a consequence of operating the receiver bases in the self-disabling format
shown in Figure 3.6, each transmission event from Alice is analyzed in two time bins
at Bob’s receiver. If these time bins are limited by the SPAD’s ability to distinguish
photon-arrival times, i.e., by the SPAD timing resolution, then Alice’s transmission
period must be at least twice as long. Thus the maximum transmission rate as
determined by the detector timing resolution is reduced by one half. The reduction
in transmission rate makes this type of receiver useful only in cases in which the
algorithmic implementation described above is somehow impractical.
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Figure 3.6: BB84 receiver with self-disabling bases. In this configuration the indi-
vidual states in each measurement basis are distinguished by their arrival times at
the SPADs. (N)PBSC is a (non) polarizing beam-splitting cube.
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3.6 Conclusions
We have presented a model for the sifted-bit production rate of BB84-type
QKD systems operating at transmission rates that exceed the maximum count rate
of the component single-photon detectors. This model addresses critical security
concerns that must be considered when operating in this regime and quantifies the
onset of dead-time effects. We have established that, with free-running SPADs, high-
speed QKD systems are paralyzable counting systems. This phenomenon emerges
from the collective behavior of the pair of detectors in a given basis, as SPADs are
non-paralyzable counting systems when considered individually. We have shown
with both analytic modeling and Monte Carlo simulation that dead-time effects
cause there to be an optimum transmission rate that maximizes the sifted-bit pro-
duction rate. The functional dependence of the maximum sifted-bit rate on the link
parameters has been presented, and these relations will be useful in the design of
QKD systems and single-photon detection systems.
This chapter has focused on polarization-encoded BB84 QKD. A useful exten-
sion of the analysis presented here would be the application of the state-space model
to other protocols and encoding schemes. In particular, the differential-phase-shift
encoding scheme used in [63] readily lends itself to extremely high transmission rates.
Detector dead times are likely to have significant influence on the performance of
such systems and the analysis of such influence in the context of the current under-
standing would be useful.
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Chapter 4
High-speed QKD in the Hα Fraunhofer Window
”Far out in the uncharted backwaters of the unfashionable end of the Western Spiral
Arm of the Galaxy lies a small critically unregarded yellow sun. Orbiting this, at a
distance of roughly ninety-eight million miles is an utterly insignificant little blue-
green planet whose ape descended life forms are so amazingly primitive that they
still think digital watches are a pretty neat idea.” Douglas Adams
4.1 Speed limits in broadband QKD
In 2004, NIST demonstrated a free-space QKD system that achieved a secret
key rate in excess of 1 MB/s [9]. This and similar systems, such as those described
in [75] and [63], represent the fastest QKD links currently in existence and are even
fast enough to stream one-time-pad encrypted video. The NIST systems achieve
their high key rates by incorporating a number of techniques, many of which have
been adapted from high-speed telecommunications engineering. Examples of this
include performing clock synchronization between the transmitter and receiver over
the classical communications channel, as well as implementing all of the control
and sifting code on a dedicated FPGA, utilizing tailored forward error correcting
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algorithms to minimize the bidirectionality of the classical conversation, and mul-
tithreading the error correction and privacy amplification steps in order to speed
up key distillation. However, in all of these systems there remains a fundamental
technology hurdle to performing faster QKD: The timing resolution of the single
photon detectors.
Figure 4.1 shows a histogram of detection events from a clocked 1.25 GHz pulse.
As evidenced from the data, the ubiquitous Perkin-Elmer single photon counting
modules used in the system have a -3 dB timing jitter of 250 ps. Nominally this
would imply that the detector could differentiate between 4 GHz pulses. However,
because the QKD protocol is inherently sensitive to errors, we must transmit at a
period greater than the -20 dB timing jitter in order to avoid data being detected
in overlapping time bins. Because the Perkin-Elmer detectors have a -20 dB timing
jitter tail in excess of 1.6 ns, the NIST 2004 QKD system described in [9] must be
limited to a 625 MHz clock rate.
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Figure 4.1: A histogram of detection events from the Perkin-Elmer SPCM, showing
a -3 dB timing jitter of 250 ps and a -20 dB timing jitter of over 1.6 ns. This intrinsic
uncertainty in the detection event timing information is the current speed limitation
in the NIST QKD system.
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4.2 The origin of timing jitter in Geiger mode avalanche photodiodes
Avalanche photodiodes biased just below the breakdown voltage (the so-called
Geiger mode of operation) have been enormously successful photon counting devices
for a number of applications, ranging from the obvious quantum optical experiments
to biophysical applications such as single-molecule spectroscopy. However, all of
these applications demand precise timing information, and the intrinsic structural
properties of the devices themselves currently limit how well they can meet those
demands. A schematic of the device is shown in Figure 4.2. As the figure illustrates,
there is a finite volume, called the depletion region, in which the incident photon
is absorbed to create the electron-hole pair. This volume must be relatively large
in order to increase the probability of photoabsorption and improve the detector’s
overall efficiency. However, a side effect of such a large absorption volume is an
intrinsic, statistical uncertainty in the time between when the photon is incident on
the front of the detector and when it is absorbed, resulting in an avalanche and final
detection pulse. This uncertainty is the origin of the detector’s timing jitter.
Also shown in Figure 4.2 is a schematic of a new design from Micro Photon
Devices, a company that has formed out of the group of Sergio Cova at the Po-
litechnico di Milan [26]. In this design, the depletion region of the device has been
reduced in thickness from 30-40 µm down to between 1 and 4 µm. Thinning this
region has the desired effect of reducing the timing jitter to as low as 35 ps, as shown
in figure 4.3.
Better timing resolution immediately allows for faster single photon trans-
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mission rates in our QKD system. However, because silicon has a higher extinction
coefficient at shorter wavelengths [44], a thinner depletion region implies that device
will also have higher quantum efficiency at shorter wavelengths. In fact, the effi-
ciency curves shown in Figure 4.4 verify that, for the thinner devices, the quantum
efficiency is not only lower overall, but the wavelength of peak detection efficiency
has shifted from the near-infrared into the visible.
The implications of lower overall quantum efficiency are obvious - lower de-
tection efficiency means higher link loss. But more importantly, the shift from peak
efficiency in the NIR to peak efficiency in the visible implies that free-space QKD
links using these detectors will be more susceptible to solar background noise. The
solar spectrum has significantly higher light levels at visible wavelengths than at
NIR ones. This is likely the factor that drove humans, a very visually dominated
species, to evolve a strong sensitivity in this spectral region. But what makes us
able to see also introduces significant errors into free-space QKD links operating
at visible wavelengths. In fact, it is likely that, without mitigating this effect, any
gain in performance from faster transmission rates will be negated by the increased
noise from the solar background. Thus any free-space QKD system whose design
is centered around these new SPADs must incorporate some additional techniques
to mitigate the background noise. In the new design presented here, two additional
features are added. First, we design our system around a Fraunhofer line in the
solar spectrum where the solar background is reduced and second, we incorporate
a sub-clock gating circuit that forces the detector to ignore a significant number of
background counts within each clock bin.
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Figure 4.2: A schematic of the structure of two different APDs [26]. On the left is
the APD in the Perkin-Elmer SPCM with a thicker depletion region and thus higher
timing jitter. On the right is a newer design from the Cova group, incorporating a
thinner depletion region and thus improved timing resolution.
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Figure 4.3: A histogram of counts from the thin MPD SPAD, showing a 35 ps timing
jitter [26].
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Figure 4.4: A comparison of the quantum efficiency curves of the Perkin-Elmer
SPCM versus the MPD device. By thinning the depletion region, the overall quan-
tum efficiency is lowered and the peak efficiency wavelength is shifted into the visible
region of the spectrum.
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4.3 Josef von Fraunhofer and the Hα line
Josef von Fraunhofer was born on March 6th, 1787, in the Bavarian town of
Straubing1. After becoming an orphan at the age of 11, he began work as an ap-
prentice in a Munich company making scientific instruments, where he learned to
make lenses and mirrors. Following a major accident that resulted in the collapse of
the building where he was working, Fraunhofer was rescued by Maximillian I Josef,
then the Prince Elector of Bavaria. This future ruler of Bavaria took Fraunhofer
under his wing, providing young Josef with books and encouraging his studies. After
eight months, Fraunhofer went to work at the Benediktbeuern Abbey’s Optical In-
stitute, which specialized in glassmaking. There he developed scientific instruments
of such quality that even Michael Faraday could not compete, shifting the center of
optical instrument manufacturing from England to Bavaria. By 1818, Fraunhofer
became the Institute’s director and eventually earned an honorary doctorate from
the University of Erlangen.
As part of his work, Fraunhofer often used sunlight and a homemade slit
spectrometer to look for impurities in his glass. He noticed that certain lines in the
transmission spectrum of his glass were always present, no matter the quality of
the material he was testing. As a result, Fraunhofer examined his source directly,
realizing that the dark lines in the spectrum were actually part of the sunlight
rather than the impurities in his glass. These lines had been missed by Newton
1This section is based on the High Altitude Observatory’s online biography of Josef von Fraun-
hofer
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in his prism work over a hundred years earlier, but William Wollaston had noticed
them previously. However, it was Fraunhofer who closely studied and cataloged the
hundreds of lines which would eventually bear his name.
Figure 4.5: Josef von Frauhofer, 1787-1826
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Figure 4.6: Fraunhofer’s original drawing of the lines in the solar specturm. He
noticed that certain lines were always present when he used sunlight to test the
glass that he made, no matter the quality of the specimen under test. He labeled
the most prominent of these lines with letters A, B, C, etc., and some of them, such
as the Sodium D line, still bear these labels.
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4.4 Free-space optical communication in the Fraunhofer window
Today these lines are known to be the result of atomic absorption in the sun’s
atmosphere and have been studied in much more depth. The visible spectrum of
the sun, as taken in false color and ’unwrapped’ by the National Optical Astronomy
Observatories in Figure 4.7, shows hundreds of such lines. One of these lines, though,
stands out as a particularly dark hole in the solar spectrum - the H-α, or Ballmer
α line, in the red region at 656.28 nm. This line is a result of the n = 2 to n = 3
absorption transition in the atomic hydrogen contained in the solar atmosphere
[49]. It is 0.12 nm wide and 7-8 dB deep. As there is some reemission by the
hydrogen atoms, the line is not completely dark. However, from a free-space optical
communication point of view, it is the equivalent of operating at perpetual twilight.
Exploiting the Fraunhofer lines to do free-space optical communication during
daylight hours is not a particularly new idea. For example, it has been considered
for links to submarines and in deep space [29]. However, in the context of QKD
this technique can be applied specifically to compensate for the extra background
counts caused by operating in the visible region. In fact, narrowband optical filters
are rather easy to come by, as they are vital for solar photography and are often
stocked as surplus items by manufacturers. Calibrations performed at the NIST
SIRCUS facility, the results of which are presented in Figure 4.8 show some of
these filters to be as narrow as 0.15 nm with a peak transmission of 70%. This
performance is achieved by using a rugate filter design. Standard dielectric stack
filters are fabricated by depositing alternating layers of materials with different
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indices of refraction. The resulting index structure has a transmission edge at the
fundamental period, but since the index alternates between two discreet values, the
edge is not ideally sharp and there are other transmission peaks at higher harmonics
of the index period. Rugate filters, on the other hand, consist of a continuous
sinusoidally varying index layer in lieu of the dielectric stack. By modulating the
index of refraction sinusoidally, the filter achieves a single transition edge that is
transform limited and is usually only about 0.1 nm wide, as shown in Figure 4.8.
Despite the difficulties in fabricating such filters, their utility in solar photography
results in mass production and their relative ubiquity.
In addition to calibrating the filter characteristics, we have directly measured
the reduction in solar background counts due to the filter’s presence. We constructed
a simple test consisting of a collimator collecting sunlight, going through the H-α
filter, then into a SPAD connected to a TTL counter. The output of the counter
was normalized to the output of another SPAD that was collecting sunlight without
a filter in order to mitigate any temporal variations in sunlight. The filter was
mounted on a computer-controlled, motorized rotation stage. The data shown in
Figure 4.9 shows that the background counts are reduced by the expected amount as
the filter is tuned across normal incidence. In fact, as the data show, the minimum
background count rate occurs just off of normal incidence, indicating that the filter
is not precisely centered at the H-α wavelength and will require some slight tuning
during operation.
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Figure 4.7: A false color, unwound depiction of the visible solar spectrum created
by the National Optical Astronomy Observatories. Fraunhofer noticed hundreds of
lines occurring in the spectrum, with a particularly dark region in the red. This
line, at 656.28 nm, is the result of the n=2 to 3 transition in atomic hydrogen in
the solar atmosphere and is particularly useful to performing free-space QKD in the
daytime with reduced background counts.
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Figure 4.8: Calibration data taken at NIST SIRCUS (many thanks to Dr. Steve
Brown) showing the performance of H-α Rugate filters, both specifically around
656.28 nm and across the broader optical spectrum.
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4.5 Single-photon sources at 656 nm
Despite the ease of obtaining filters at the H-α wavelength, there are very few
fast pulsed optical sources at that wavelength. The 2004 NIST system is based on
gain-switched VCSEL diodes that are designed for high-speed modulation. However,
for market reasons these devices are fabricated at 850 nm, and no comparable device
exists in the visible spectrum. One approach that we have taken to generating red
pulses has been to implement a pulse carving scheme using a CW tunable laser
and an external intensity modulator. The laser is a Sacher external cavity tunable
diode laser designed for Hydrogen spectroscopy and the modulator is a custom
Mach-Zender type Electro-optic intensity modulator designed by EOSpace, Inc., to
operate in the visible spectrum. While we have demonstrated the feasibility of this
approach, as demonstrated by the histogram in Figure 4.10, we have observed several
limitations. First, we have found that the external cavity diode laser is not stable
enough in frequency for the long operation required by a QKD system. This effect
is not unique to our laser and has been observed in other lasers and even in units
built by other manufacturers. Additionally, the modulator is highly sensitive to
wavelength, temperature and polarization effects, resulting in low on-off extinction
ratios over long periods of operation.
To work around both of these effects, we have identified a number of possible
solutions. The most obvious but most difficult approach would be to directly fabri-
cate 656 nm VCSELs. However, this approach is rather high risk, as little is known
about the issues associated with high-speed visible diodes. The second, more feasi-
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Figure 4.9: Data showing solar background counts versus tuning angle of the H-
α filter. Note that the minimum does not occur precisely at normal incidence,
indicating that the filter is not quite centered on the H-α line and will require some
tuning during operation.
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ble approach, is to use off-the-shelf visible diodes that are selected to match the H-α
wavelength and then to fabricate custom electro-absorption modulators to do pulse
carving. EA modulators can exploit intrinsic nonlinearities in the device to achieve
extinction ratios approaching -60 dB. This approach seems to be a better alternative
to both the scheme already implemented and the idea of fabricating visible VCSELs
from scratch.
141
Figure 4.10: A count histogram showing a 60 ps pulse generated using an external
cavity laser diode and a custom visible EO modulator. While the extinction ratio is
nominally -20 dB, we have observed that the laser is not stable and the modulator
suffers from oversensitivity to environmental fluctuations.
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4.6 Sub-clock gating
In general, the engineering challenge in free-space quantum cryptography re-
duces to the problem of finding and measuring the single photon of interest among
the slew of solar background photons incident on Bob’s receiver aperture during any
given pulse. Thus any information you can provide Bob’s receiver about the single
photon’s wavelength, position, and time of arrival will aid in setting the signal apart
from the noise. In addition to good spectral filters, narrow receiver apertures, and
careful wavelength selection, another tool we can use is time gating. Even though we
are limited in transmission speed by the detector’s timing jitter and we synchronize
Alice and Bob’s clocks via the classical channel, we have much finer control over
where the pulse occurs within the timing bin than simply the clock speed. In fact,
as Figures 4.11 and 4.12 show, most of the detection counts fall within a very narrow
window within the clock bin. Employing a technique we call sub-clock gating, we can
essentially instruct the detector to ignore any detection events that occur outside of
this small window within the clock cycle. To do this, we implement a rather simple
AND gate circuit show in Figure 4.13, albeit one that must operate with very fast
rise times. To achieve this, we incorporate fast InP logic that can operate at clock
speeds up to 40 GHz. The histogram in Figure 4.14 shows the effects of such a
circuit, eliminating much of the background noise between pulses.
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Figure 4.11: A linear scale histogram showing 625 MHz pulses. On this scale it is
apparent that the pulses are very well localized in the transmission clock bin.
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Figure 4.12: A plot showing the percentage of counts within a sub-clock gate as
a function of the gate width. Note that for gate times greater than 150 ps, over
80% of the signal counts are retained while most of the background counts between
transmission events are eliminated.
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Figure 4.13: A schematic of the sub-clock gating circuit used to eliminate much of
the background noise. The AND gate is a 40 GHz InP logic device.
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Figure 4.14: A histogram showing the receiver counts before and after the sub-clock
gating circuit. Most of the background counts between pulses are eliminated.
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4.7 Performance projections using MODTRAN
In considering a new free-space QKD system that incorporates all of these
improvements, we can now use the various system parameters to predict its overall
performance. However, one system parameter that we have not yet taken into ac-
count is the atmosphere. There are many subtleties in predicting the transmission
through the atmosphere and the scattering of solar background radiation. Cur-
rently the most common model for such prediction is MODTRAN, an atmospheric
modeling program created by the U.S. Air Force and used extensively to model elec-
tromagnetic wave propagation through the atmosphere. The details of the software
can be found in [8]. It suffices that the model takes into account the various link
parameters such as location, time of day, season, link geometry, and atmospheric
conditions and provides predictions of both the atmospheric transmission and the
scattered background spectrum over the wavelength range of interest. The wave-
length resolution of the model is considered to be moderate, as compared with the
LOWTRAN and HITRAN variants of the model. While the model does not con-
tain the actual H-α line, we can combine the background level with the measured
reduction in counts to determine the predicted value of scattered solar background
photons. Figure 4.15 shows the MODTRAN outputs for our current link geometry
at NIST. It assumes a mid-spring day with few clouds and good visibility.
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Figure 4.15: Atmospheric transmission and scattered solar background spectra from
MODTRAN for the NIST free-space QKD link geometry. The model was run for
the day April 15th, with few clouds and 23 km of visibility. Note the large number
of water lines in the atmospheric transmission spectrum.
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Using these data along with the rest of the system parameters, we now have
all of the information we require to make a prediction of the link performance. The
most fundamental performance metric of any QKD link is the sifted bit rate. We










In this expression, the first term represents the actual single photon transmissions
from Alice, where µ is the mean photon number, assumed to be 0.1, Tatmos is the
atmospheric transmission taken from MODTRAN, η is the detector efficiency, and
∆t is the transmission period. The factor of two in the denominator accounts for the
sifting. The second term accounts for the detector dark counts that occur when no
photon is incident on the detector. D is the detector dark count rate as specified by
the manufacturer, and the factor of 2 accounts for the events from four detectors, half
of which are sifted. The final term accounts for solar background noise, where Rsky is
the scattered solar background photon rate taken from combining the MODTRAN
with the H-α filter data, A is the receiver aperture area, ∆t′ is the gate width, λ
is the wavelength, ∆λ is the spectral filter width, and Ω is the receiver aperture’s
solid angle.
From the sifted bit rate, we can then calculate the expected quantum bit error








As is evident from the numerator, errors come from both dark counts and scattered
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sunlight.
Finally, using the QBER, we can then calculate the expected secret key rate.
The secret key rate is determined directly from the QBER, as the EC/PA algorithm
is limited only by the error rate. This speaks to the security of QKD, where any
attempt to eavesdrop on the key will simply raise the error rate. Once the error
rate goes above a few percent, whether due to dark counts, solar background, or
even the presence of an eavesdropper, the EC/PA algorithm will no longer be able
to distill secret bits from the sifted key and the communications will stall2 . Below
this cutoff error rate, however, the secret key rate is given by
ρsecret = 2.8e
(−28×QBER) (4.3)
This expression is determined purely from empirical tests of the current version of
the EC/PA software running on the current Linux-based Xeon workstations and will
undoubtedly change as the software is updated and ported to higher performance
machines. However, using this expression, we can estimate the final secret key rate of
a link built as described above. We assume the following parameters for the calcula-
tion: µ = 0.1 photons/pulse, η = 0.34,∆t = 400ps, D = 750 counts per second, A =
30 cm2, λ = 656.28 nm,∆λ = 0.12 nm, and the atmospheric visibility is 23 km. The
results of the calculations are outlined in Table 4.1. The calculation is performed
for various sub-clock gate times, showing the dramatic decrease in background noise
resulting from the gating circuit.
2Note that, in the QKD security proof, it is assumed that all errors are due to an eavesdropper.
Thus the system is not immune to a denial of service attack
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Table 4.1: Performance predictions at various gate times for the proposed H-alpha
QKD link
Gate Width (ps) Sifted Key
Rate (Mb/s)
QBER (%) Secret Key
Rate (Mb/s)
400 (ungated) 3.6635 4.10 0.8849
200 3.3040 2.28 1.4749
100 2.4586 1.55 1.8133
As the table shows, we expect to see up to a two-fold increase in the secret key
rate using these new detectors at the H-α wavelength. As we increase the key rate,
we will begin to approach the regime where a small number of multiplexed links can
be used together to achieve the goal of a 10 Mb/S, OTP-encrypted QKD link that
is compatible with first-generation ethernet.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions - The future of broadband QKD
”You sort of start thinking anything’s possible if you’ve got enough nerve.” - J. K.
Rowling
5.1 Advances in sources, detectors, and systems
In this thesis, I have outlined a number of advances relating to the various
components of broadband QKD. I have demonstrated progress on a new source of
entanglement for QKD. This source, based on birefringent phase matched four wave
mixing, provides a number of advantages over existing sources of generating entan-
glement, including reduced Raman noise, more compact size, and stronger nonlinear
interaction. However, as with any integrated photonic device, this approach poses
unique challenges. The simple task of coupling light in and out of micro- and nano-
scale photonics poses a particular challenge. In addition, the specific nonlinear
process of interest is not well characterized compared to other nonlinear interac-
tions. Overall, we have demonstrated that, at the very least, the ability to fabricate
a device with the proper characteristics to perform birefringent phase-matched four
wave mixing. We have also constructed a setup to investigate other materials that
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may have stronger nonlinearity for their suitability as correlation sources.
We have also demonstrated a very important result relating to high-speed
QKD using detectors with finite dead time. This result uncovers a key security
vulnerability in fast QKD systems and provides a straightforward modification to
the BB84 protocol that does not excessively limit the transmission rate. This mod-
ified protocol will become increasingly important as systems begin to operate at
multi-gigahertz transmission rates. The counterintuitive existence of an optimal
transmission rate is also an interesting result of this analysis.
Finally, I present a new concept of a QKD system based around faster detectors
that will hopefully push the key rate toward the goal of 10 Mb/s. This system, when
built, will represent the most advanced QKD link in the world.
5.2 Personal contributions to each project
I personally made significant contributions to each project. The nonlinear
photonics project, in fact, was an original idea inspired by the research of Dr. Alan
Migdall’s group at NIST in microstructure fiber sources. I initiated the project and
was the sole party responsible at each step, excluding the actual device fabrication,
but including refining the concept of the approach, designing the device, and char-
acterizing its properties and performance. I gained extensive experience in photonic
device design using various simulation tools and did all of the work setting up the
source and apparatus to perform the testing. In addition, I gained invaluable ex-
perience setting up a collaboration between NIST and LPS. Once the collaboration
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was established, the actual MBE and fabrication work was left in the able hands of
Dr. Chris Richardson.
On the project investigating detector dead-time issues, I was specifically re-
sponsible for the simulation work and the investigation of the key correlations. I
made contributions to the analytical investigation, though the original concept of
the state space was initiated by Dr. Anastase Nakassis and Dr. Joshua Bienfang. In
addition, some of the calculations relating to transition probabilities were developed
by Dr. Hai Xu.
My personal contributions to the Hα system design were extensive, though I
was not the original inspiration for the idea. That concept was initiated by Dr. Bill
Jeffrey, formerly the Director of NIST, upon hearing about the problems associated
with the new SPADs. Once we began looking into operating in one of the Fraunhofer
lines, I was responsible for all of the MODTRAN modeling and the calculations
relating to the Hα line. The experiemental measurements of the solar background
counts and the calculations predicting the system performance were an equal effort
between Dr. Joshua Bienfang and myself. The calibration of the Hα filter was
performed by Dr. Steve Brown of the NIST SIRCUS facility.
5.3 The future of free-space and fiber optic QKD
Recent demonstrations of free-space QKD have elicited strong interest in the
technology for practical applications. The final chapter of this thesis proposed a
new design for a free-space QKD system. While it may not end up that most fast
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free-space QKD systems rely on a Fraunhofer line to reduce the solar background
noise, the basic elements of the free-space system proposed will hopefully continue
to push the speed limits of quantum cryptography for a number of years. Already
there are plans to demonstrate this new system over a 16 km link provided by the
Naval Research Laboratory. If successful, this will certainly be the most advanced
demonstration of free-space QKD in terms of distance-bandwidth product. Such a
system will be vital to implementing the concept of a satellite-based, global quantum
encrypted network.
The other facet of QKD research focuses on short haul fiber based systems.
While not addressed here, there are a number of research avenues that have the po-
tential to make great advances in fiber-based QKD. One of the most promising ap-
proaches to fiber-based QKD is single-sideband encoding[41]. In this approach, the
bits are encoded on the frequency of the single quanta, a property that is much more
stable in a fiber than polarization or phase. While this approach has received little
attention in the research community, it promises to be one of the most practicable
implementations of QKD known to date. In fact, it even offers much more potential
as an entangled system than other approaches. Generating frequency entanglement
is significantly more straightforward than generating polarization entanglement and
often involves only a single nonlinear process rather than two. Hence there is much
potential to make advances in frequency-coding and develop frequency entanglement
sources for significantly improved fiber-based quantum key distribution systems.
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5.4 QKD in the marketplace
The final question that remains in the QKD community is whether there exists
a real-world need for such a technology. In the modern IT security infrastructure,
cryptography is certainly one of the strongest links in the chain. Often vulnerabili-
ties occur from faulty implementations of security procedures or social engineering
attacks on lapses in user vigilance. Thus it is almost always easier to attack another
point of entry rather than the encrypted data set itself.
That said, there still exists a vulnerability. Not only is there no proof that one
cannot break RSA encryption with a classical computer, but quantum computers
that are on the long-term technology horizon have already been shown to readily
break RSA. Even if a system implements perfect security with the most advanced
classical cryptography, it is still vulnerable to attacks that record the ciphertext in
order to break it in 50 years or so, when the technology required will very likely
be available. Thus any customer who has information that needs to be secret for a
long period of time, whether it be governments, financial institutions, or health care
providers, has a need for communications that are immune to eavesdropping from
any adversary, now or in the future.
Whether this market exists is still unknown. However, even it if did, there
is still a significant amount of technical work that remains until QKD can keep
pace with today’s, and especially tomorrow’s, IT infrastructure. Increases in speed
and transmission distance, robustness to real-world perturbations, and validations
of the security of the protocols all still need research attention if any market were
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to become interested in quantum encryption.
The future of QKD is at a crossroads. If it becomes of interest in the IT
marketplace, then we will look forward to many exciting advances as the technology
gains its place in the everyday world. If it remains only an exotic sideshow in the
IT security community, then it certainly has produced technology that will be of
use in other arenas. Either way, science is science, and we continue to trudge on.
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Appendix A
Index of refraction calculation for aluminum gallium arsenide
This C code implements the detailed calculation of the bulk index of refraction
for the ternary zincblende semiconductor Al(x)Ga(1-x)As, for any temperature and
aluminum fraction. The code is implemented as a MATLAB MEX file that can be
compiled into a MATLAB-compatible function. For a detailed description of this
code and its applications, see [23].
//file algaas_mex.c
/************************************
MATLAB MEX file version of...
Calculator for index of refraction
of bulk Al(x)Ga(1-x)As including
temperature dependence
MATLAB format: n = algaas_mex(lambda, x, T)
Based on Gehrsitz, et al., J. Appl. Phys.,
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const double E2_sq = 0.724e-3;
const double C2 = 1.55e-3;
const double E3_sq = 1.331e-3;
const double C3 = 2.61e-3;
E_sq = pow(lambda, -2.0);
r = (((1-x)*C2)/(E2_sq-E_sq)) + (x*C3/(E3_sq-E_sq));
return r;
}
double A0(double T) //temp in K
{
return 5.9613 + (7.178e-4*T) - (0.953e-6*T*T);
}
double E10_sq(double T) //temp in K
{
return 4.7171 - (3.237e-4*T) - (1.358e-6*T*T);
}
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double E_Gamma(double T) //temp in K
{
double p,q,eg;
p = 1 - coth(15.9/(2.0*kB*T));
q = 1 - coth(33.6/(2.0*kB*T));
eg = 1.5192 + (1.8*15.9e-3*p) + (1.1*33.6e-3*q);
return eg/1.239865;
}
double A(double x, double T)
{
double c0;
const double c1 = -16.159;
const double c2 = 43.511;
const double c3 = -71.317;
const double c4 = 57.535;
const double c5 = -17.451;
c0 = A0(T);
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const double c0 = 21.5647;
const double c1 = 113.74;
const double c2 = -122.5;
const double c3 = 108.401;
const double c4 = -47.318;
return c0 + c1*x + c2*x*x + c3*x*x*x + c4*x*x*x*x;
}
double E1_sq(double x, double T)
{
double c0;
const double c1 = 11.006;
const double c2 = -3.08;
c0 = E10_sq(T);
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const double c0 = 50.535;
const double c1 = -150.7;
const double c2 = -62.209;
const double c3 = 797.16;
const double c4 = -1125;
const double c5 = 503.79;
c = c0 + c1*x + c2*x*x + c3*x*x*x + c4*x*x*x*x + c5*x*x*x*x*x;
return (1.0/c);
}





const double c1 = 1.1308;
const double c2 = 0.1436;
c0 = E_Gamma(T);
e0 = c0 + c1*x + c2*x*x;
return (e0*e0);
}
double n(double lambda, double x, double T) //lambda in microns, x in %, T in K
{
double E_sq, n_sq;
E_sq = pow(lambda, -2.0);





MATLAB equivalent of main()
used in creating a C-based MATLAB compatible function...
For fomatting and documentation, see MATLAB mex helpfile or http://cnx.org/
**************************************/




double lambda, x, T, index;







index = n(lambda, x, T);








Monte-Carlo QKD Simulation Code
For a detailed description of this code and its applications, see Chapter 3.
B.1 Traditional BB84 protocol
The following code performs a simulation of traditional BB84 QKD using











































//calculates the probability that the next bit










int i, d, b;















while (bit_count < NBITS){
//roll seven dice...
r1 = (double)rand()/((double)RAND_MAX + 1); //Alice’s basis
r2 = (double)rand()/((double)RAND_MAX + 1); //Alice’s bit value
r3 = (double)rand()/((double)RAND_MAX + 1); //link loss
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r4 = (double)rand()/((double)RAND_MAX + 1); //Bob’s basis
r5 = (double)rand()/((double)RAND_MAX + 1); //Bob’s bit value (if req’d)
r6 = (double)rand()/((double)RAND_MAX + 1); //Error introduction/Background Counts
r7 = (double)rand()/((double)RAND_MAX + 1); //Detector Efficiency
//generate Alice’s random bits...
a_basis = (r1 < 0.5) ? HV_BASIS : LR_BASIS;
a_value = (r2 < 0.5) ? 0 : 1;
if (r3 > LINK_LOSS){
//select Bob’s basis
b_basis = (r4 < 0.5) ? HV_BASIS : LR_BASIS;
//sift
if (a_basis == b_basis){ //Bit goes through and is recorded...
b_value = a_value;
b_value = (r6<QBER) ? (!b_value) : b_value; //introduce errors...
d = (b_basis*2) + b_value; //selects H,V,L or R... I know, I’m pretty clever...









else{ //basis is wrong, and detector fires, but bit is not recorded...
b_value = (r5 < 0.5) ? 1 : 0;
d = (b_basis*2) + b_value;






//increment dead time counters with the clock...















int main(int argc, char* argv[])
{
int i, j, result, dt;
double avg, rate;
int dstart, dstop, dstep;














avg = (det_counts[H] + det_counts[V] + det_counts[L] + det_counts[R])/4.0;
rate = avg/clk;




B.2 Modified BB84 protocol
This version of the code incorporates the modification required to maintain
security in the presence of long dead times (see Chapter 3). Unlike the previous
version, this one runs the simulation in ’real time,’ meaning it includes a fundamental
time unit of 100 ps. All transmission events, dead times, etc., are scaled to this






//===== OPERATING PARAMETERS =======
#define RUN_TIME (100000000) //number of 0.1 nsec units to run simulation
#define TX_PER_START_EXP (0.0)
#define TX_PER_STOP_EXP (3.0) //tx_per = 10 ^ TX_Exp...
#define TX_PER_STEP_EXP (0.2)
//we want to scan from 10 MHz to 10 GHz TX rate
//so we set the fundamental time unit to 100 ps
//and run for TX rates from 1 clock cycle to
// 1,000 clock cycles





























void doQKD(long int tx_per, int dead_time) //both params in units of 100 ps
{
int i, d, d2;

















for (clk = 0; clk <= RUN_TIME; clk++){
if((clk % tx_per) == 0){
//roll seven dice...
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r1 = (double)rand()/((double)RAND_MAX + 1); //Alice’s basis
r2 = (double)rand()/((double)RAND_MAX + 1); //Alice’s bit value
r3 = (double)rand()/((double)RAND_MAX + 1); //link loss
r4 = (double)rand()/((double)RAND_MAX + 1); //Bob’s basis
r5 = (double)rand()/((double)RAND_MAX + 1); //Bob’s bit value (if req’d)
r6 = (double)rand()/((double)RAND_MAX + 1); //Error introduction/Background Counts
r7 = (double)rand()/((double)RAND_MAX + 1); //Detector Efficiency
//generate Alice’s random bits...
a_basis = (r1 < 0.5) ? HV_BASIS : LR_BASIS;
a_value = (r2 < 0.5) ? 0 : 1;
if (r3 > LINK_LOSS){
//select Bob’s basis
b_basis = (r4 < 0.5) ? HV_BASIS : LR_BASIS;
//sift
if (a_basis == b_basis){ //Bit goes through and is recorded...
b_value = a_value;
b_value = (r6<QBER) ? (!b_value) : b_value; //introduce errors...
d = (b_basis*2) + b_value; //selects H,V,L or R...
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//d2 is assigned other detector in basis - this is the modification to BB84...
d2 = ((d%2) == 0) ? d+1 : d-1;




sift_flags[b_basis] = 1; //a bit is recorded... set sift flag
}
else{
if (sift_flags[b_basis] == 0){
bob_key[bit_count] = b_value;
bit_count++;






else{ //basis is wrong, and detector fires, but bit is not recorded...
b_value = (r5 < 0.5) ? 1 : 0;
d = (b_basis*2) + b_value;







//increment dead time counters with the clock...










if ((!(dead_flags[H])) && (!(dead_flags[V])))
sift_flags[HV_BASIS] = 0;










for(t_ex=TX_PER_START_EXP; t_ex <= TX_PER_STOP_EXP; t_ex += TX_PER_STEP_EXP){
tx_per = (int)ceil(pow(10.0, t_ex));
doQKD(tx_per, DEAD_TIME);
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